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In recent years, financial economists and commercial providers of gov-
ernance services have created measures of corporate governance quality that
collapse into one number (a governance rating or index) the multiple dimen-
sions of a company's governance, measures which commercial providers mar-
ket to institutional investors as aids for portfolio and proxy voting decisions.
The aim of this Article is twofold: to analyze the effectiveness of corporate
governance indices in predicting corporate performance and to consider the
implications for public policy that follow from that assessment. We highlight
methodological shortcomings of the extant research that claims to have identi-
fied a relation between particular governance measures and corporate per-
formance. Our core conclusion is that there is no consistent relation between
governance indices and measures of corporate performance. Namely, there is
no one "best" measure of corporate governance: The most effective govern-
ance system depends on context and on firms' specific circumstances. It
would therefore be difficult for an index, or any one variable, to capture
nuances critical for making informed decisions. As a consequence, we con-
clude that governance indices are highly imperfect instruments for determin-
ing how to vote corporate proxies, let alone for making portfolio investment
decisions, and that investors and policymakers should exercise caution in
attempting to draw inferences regarding a firm's quality orfuture stock mar-
ket performance from its ranking on any particular corporate governance
measure. Most important, because there is considerable variation in the rela-
tion between indices and measures of corporate performance, our analysis
suggests that corporate governance is an area where a regulatory regime of
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ample, flexible variation across firms that eschews governance mandates is
particularly desirable.
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INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance took on a new urgency in the aftermath of
Enron's collapse and a succession of accounting scandals. It became a
topic of intense media and activist institutional investor interest, in the
hope that closer scrutiny of firms' governance could prevent further
Enrons.' At the same time, corporations were being forced to reconsider
1. For example, there were 426 news stories containing the term "corporate
governance" in the New York Times in 2002, compared to only sixty-nine in 2000, as found
in a LEXIS search in the New York Times file in the News library conducted on August 31,
2008. A search of the entire News library in LEXIS found similar results, although the
order of magnitude differs: There were 38,745 articles referring to corporate governance
in 2002, compared to 18,134 articles in 2000. Activist institutions, such as union and public
pension funds, directed their engagement in the post-Enron proxy process toward
advancing their views of good corporate governance. Corporate governance proposals-as
identified by the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC), which tracks
shareholder proposals submitted at over 1,900 firms, including the Fortune 500 and S&P
500-increased by almost forty percent after 2001, averaging 275 over the four years before
2001 and 380 the four years after. The topicality of corporate governance in the media has
not abated: In the seven years since Enron filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on December
2, 2001, there have been 1,760 New York Times news stories containing the phrase
corporate governance" (as searched in LEXIS on September 19, 2008), whereas to reach a
comparable count prior to that date, one has to cumulate news stories over seventeen years
back to 1984 (totaling 1,718).
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their governance by federal legislation and stock exchange listing re-
quirements that were enacted in reaction to the scandals and that empha-
sized corporate governance solutions. 2 And mutual funds were pushed to
become more involved in governance under regulation adopted by the
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which required funds
to adopt written policies on proxy voting and to disclose their specific
votes.3 In turn, the heightened attention accorded corporate governance
increased the demand for third-party corporate-governance-related ser-
vices-by institutional investors for research and advice on proxy voting
and by corporations for advice on how to improve their governance
ratings.
Shortly before the surge in interest in corporate governance, a team
of financial economists-Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick
(GIM)-wrote a seminal paper in which they constructed an index of
corporate governance quality for a large number of publicly traded U.S.
firms. They found that higher-quality governance as defined by their in-
dex was associated with improved future stock performance. 4 The focus
on corporate governance following Enron's collapse made GIM's find-
ings of great interest to a far wider audience than corporate governance
scholars.
In particular, the relation between governance and performance
identified in GIM's paper offered intellectual support for commercial
governance-ranking services. This connection was not lost on commer-
cial governance service providers. Although GIM had been assiduously
careful in interpreting their data and did not draw causal connections
2. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775-77
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1 (2006)) (requiring that all audit committee
members be independent); Order Approving NYSE and NASD Proposed Rules Changes
Relating to Corporate Governance, 68 Fed. Reg. 64,154 (Nov. 12, 2003) (approving NYSE
Final Rule to be codified at NYSE Listing Manual 303A and NASD Amendments to Rules
4200 and 4350(c), requiring that majority of board and all compensation and nomination
committee members be independent).
3. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered
Management Investment Companies, 68 Fed. Reg. 6564 (Feb. 7, 2003) (codified at 17
C.F.R. pts. 239, 249, 270, 274).
4. Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices 18-26 (Nat'l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8449, 2001), available at http://www.nber.org/
papers/w8449.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Gompers et al.,
Corporate Governance Working Paper]. The paper was presented at NBER's 2001
summer conference; however, it was not published until two years later. GIM's research
was both a response to and an outgrowth of an important finance-literature move in which
countries were classified by the quality of their corporate law's protection of shareholders
and correlations were identified between the quality of the regime and favorable economic
features such as growth and market capitalization. Cf., e.g., Rafael LaPorta et al., Law and
Finance, 106J. Pol. Econ. 1113, 1113 (1998) (examining and comparing shareholder and
creditor protection laws and legal enforcement in forty-nine different countries). Because
that comparative literature did not operate at the firm level in analyzing corporate
governance but instead used laws "on the books," GIM's paper was both a natural and
influential extension of that literature's finding that "law mattered."
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between good governance and superior performance, commercial gov-
ernance service providers, and some institutional investor activists, exer-
cised no such caution. 5 This incaution fed the demand for and supply of
governance services, which accelerated post-Enron. Today, a market for
corporate governance ratings exists, with proxy-advising firms-such as
the dominant market leader, Institutional Shareholder Services, Inc.
(ISS) 6-using ratings to formulate voting recommendations and other
governance-rating providers using them to advise on investment
decisions. 7
The idea underlying ratings construction is to benchmark a firm's
governance features against what the index constructor considers to be
best practices. Accordingly, a firm's score on the index or rating is in-
tended to provide a readily comparable, summary measure of governance
5. Cf. Institutional S'holder Servs., An Overview of the ISS CGQ® Methodology
Changes 1 (2005), at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/CGQOverviewChanges.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter ISS Overview] (stating ISS's marketing claims
regarding relation between its governance ranking and performance); The Corp. Library,
About The Corporate Library's Governance Ratings, at http://www.thecorporatelibrary.
com/info.php?id=53 (last visited Sept. 19, 2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter The Corp. Library, About] (stating that its ratings are based on factors "tested
against actual investment returns"); The Corp, Library, The Most Intelligent Assessment of
Corporate Governance, at http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/info.php?id=52 (last
visited Sept. 19, 2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter The Corp.
Library, Assessment] (stating that it identified set of "proven dynamic indicators" that
determine when boards are "most likely to enhance and preserve shareholder value");
infra note 65 (noting Glass, Lewis & Co.'s use of academic research in construction and
marketing of its governance ranking system).
6. Note that ISS has since been acquired by RiskMetrics, but because sources cited in
this Article predate the name change we use "ISS" here.
7. See Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. Corp. L. 887, 898-99
(2007). In marketing their products and services, commercial index providers often
emphasize the usefulness of their indices in portfolio decisions, with voting decisions listed
as an additional use or service. See, p.g., Glass, Lewis & Co., What We Do, at http://www.
glasslewis.com/solutions/index.php (last visited Sept. 19, 2008) (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) ("In addition to research, Glass Lewis provides . . .complete proxy voting
services. ); GovernanceMetrics Int'l, Who Uses GMI Ratings?, at http://www.gmi
ratings.com/(rvmrks5545fmmd25cuzkhjrl)/RatingProcess.aspx (last visited Sept. 19, 2008)
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("GMI Ratings and Rating Reports are designed
primarily as a risk measurement tool to complement traditional security analysis and
financial modeling."). Because ISS also provides governance consulting services to firms,
some commentators have criticized its use of its own governance index in its proxy voting
advice as creating an inherent conflict of interest. See Rose, supra, at 906-07; Jeffrey
Sonnenfeld, Good Governance and the Misleading Myths of Bad Metrics, 18 Acad. Mgmt.
Executive 108, 111 (2004). ISS's position is that there is no conflict because it has
established "firewalls" between its consulting division and its index division, similar to the
practice in investment banks for mitigating conflicts across the various services banks offer
firms and investors. Of course, not all providers of governance rankings are in a conflicted
position, since many do not engage in issuer consulting services or provision of proxy
voting advice. In our view, reliance on governance indices in proxy voting is problematic
quite apart from whether there is a conflict of interest, and we therefore do not address
this issue.
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quality. However, establishing a relation between governance and per-
formance is technically difficult. The two variables, governance and per-
formance, are plausibly endogenous, meaning that their relationship is
bidirectional rather than unidirectional. And using existing indices can
magnify that problem because their construction is based on two factually
incorrect assumptions: one, that good governance components do not
vary across firms; and, two, that such components are always comple-
ments and never substitutes.
The aim of this Article is twofold: first, to analyze the performance
of corporate governance indices as predictors of corporate performance;
and, second, to consider the public policy implications that follow from
that assessment. This Article examines methodological issues in the con-
struction and interpretation of governance indices and their relation to
performance not so much to critique the foundational work of GIM, al-
though we do that, but rather to criticize the use to which corporate gov-
ernance indices such as GIM's have been put.8 Because the precise con-
struction of commercial indices is viewed as proprietary information by
their owners and thus is not publicly disclosed, our analysis focuses on the
relation between corporate performance and existing academic indices,
some of which are, fortunately for our purposes, closely linked to com-
mercial ones. Nevertheless, we believe that conclusions from this analysis
are equally applicable to the use of commercial indices. This judgment is
bolstered by a recent study that finds no systematic relation between com-
mercial governance ratings and firms' future performance.9
Our core conclusion is that there is no consistent relation between
the academic and related commercial governance indices and corporate
performance. In short, there is no one "best" measure of corporate gov-
ernance: The most effective governance institution depends on context
and on firms' specific circumstances. It would therefore be difficult for
an index, or any one variable, to capture critical nuances necessary for
making informed regulatory, investing, or proxy voting decisions. As a
consequence, we also conclude that governance indices are highly imper-
fect and that investors and policymakers should exercise utmost caution
in attempting to draw inferences regarding a firm's quality or future stock
market performance from its ranking on any particular governance mea-
sure. If we had to make a choice between using an index and one varia-
ble to predict performance from the quality of a firm's governance, we
8. For other commentators' concerns about the leading governance indices, see, e.g.,
Rose, supra note 7, at 906-19 (outlining concerns in three areas: conflict of interest,
methodology, and consequent governance homogenization); Sonnenfeld, supra note 7, at
108 (criticizing governance index creators' methodologies, conflicts-of-interest, and
results).
9. Robert Daines et al., Rating the Ratings: How Good Are Commercial Governance
Ratings? (Stanford Law Sch. John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No.
360, 2008), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/images/CBLWorkshop/DGL_2008-09-
26.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). That paper and related findings in research
by two of us are discussed infra Part II.C.1.
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would in fact select one variable: the median independent director's
stockholdings. We conclude from the research that two of us have under-
taken that this one variable performs better overall with respect to evalu-
ating corporate performance.
Most important, our analysis implies that corporate governance is an
area where a flexible regulatory regime allowing ample variation across
firms is particularly desirable as there is considerable variation in the rela-
tion between different governance indices and different measures of per-
formance. In essence, mandatory governance terms are the functional
equivalent of a governance index that has the force of law, because such
terms impose on all firms, without allowance for customization to a firm's
specific circumstances, governance characteristics that a legislature or
regulator considers to be best practices, just as is done by an index con-
structor in selecting his index's components.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly summarizes the
principal mechanisms of corporate governance and the research on their
relation to corporate performance, and then turns to the indices that
have been advanced to measure the quality of firms' corporate govern-
ance. Part II introduces our methodological concerns regarding the indi-
ces' construction and discusses recent work by two of us on the relation
between governance mechanisms and performance that calls into ques-
tion findings in the academic literature concerning that relation. Finally,
in Part III, we draw upon the earlier analysis to suggest when, if ever,
specific governance indices might prove to be useful for investors, and,
more importantly, we outline what our analysis implies concerning the
direction corporate governance regulation ought to take.
I. MEASURING CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
In the years since GIM's watershed contribution, a number of aca-
demic and commercial indices have been created to measure the quality
of firms' governance. After identifying the principal corporate govern-
ance mechanisms from which the indices are derived, we review research
investigating the relation between those governance mechanisms and
firm performance. We then discuss the leading governance indices and
the initial findings regarding their relation to performance. The identifi-
cation of any relation between individual governance mechanisms and
firm performance has been elusive. By reducing multiple dimensions of
governance to one number, indices theoretically have the potential to
illuminate a relation between governance and performance that cannot
be identified in analyses based on individual governance components.
A. Institutions of Corporate Governance
The key focus of U.S. corporate law and corporate governance sys-
tems is what is referred to as an agency problem: an organizational con-
cern that arises when the owners-in a corporation, the shareholders-
are not the managers who are in control. When owners and managers
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are not identical, the managers can take actions that benefit themselves at
the owners' (shareholders') expense. For example, managers may not
work as diligently as they could because the increase in firm value that
their hard work produces is shared with stockholders (in proportion to
stockholders' equity investments), while managers bear the full cost of
their greater exertion. Corporate law seeks to mitigate the agency prob-
lem by providing an organizing framework to facilitate and support
mechanisms of firms' corporate governance by which managers are in-
centivized and constrained to act in the shareholders' interest. The most
elemental components of a corporate governance system are the board of
directors, shareholder meetings and voting, and executive
compensation.i 0
1. The Board of Directors. - Directors who are not employees of the
corporation (independent or outside directors) are considered by some
commentators and many institutional investors to be the crucial corpo-
rate governance mechanism for monitoring managers." Congress and
the stock exchanges, under the shadow of the SEC, have codified this
notion of the directors' role by mandating, respectively, appointment of
independent directors to all of the audit committee positions, and to all
of the compensation and nominating committee positions and a majority
of the board.' 2 In addition, investor organizations identified most closely
with public pension and union funds have outlined best practices, the
10. Cf., e.g., Council of Institutional Investors, The Council of Institutional Investors
Corporate Governance Policies 1 (2008), available at http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/
council%20policies/CII%2OCorp%20Gov%2OPolicies%204-11-08%20Final.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter CII Policies] (outlining Council of Institutional
Investors corporate governance policies, which consist of governance guidelines in the
areas of "The Board of Directors," "Shareholder Voting Rights," "Shareholder Meetings,"
"Executive Compensation," and "Director Compensation"). The first three components-
boards, shareholder voting, and shareholder meetings-are typically codified in state
corporation laws. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§.141, 211, 212 (2007). The NewYork
Stock Exchange's corporate governance listing requirements focus on boards of directors
and shareholder voting on compensation plans. See NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual
§§ 303A.00-.08, at http://www.nyse.com/regulation/listed/1182508124422.html (last
visited Oct. 8, 2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
11. See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., Global Principles of Accountable
Corporate Governance 8 (2008), available at http://www.calpers-governance.org/
principles/docs/2008-8-18-global-principles-accountable-corp-gov-final.pdf (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (noting CalPERS's opinion that "independent boards are
essential to a sound governance structure" and recognizing that "[n]early all corporate
governance commentators agree that boards should be comprised of at least a majority of
'independent directors'"); CII Policies, supra note 10, §§ 2.3-.4, at 3 (requiring that two-
thirds of directors be independent and that certain board committees be wholly
independent). The classic academic work advocating independent directors is Melvin A.
Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation: A Legal Analysis (1976).
12. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m) (2006) (regulating
composition of audit committees); NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual §§ 303A.00-.06
(setting composition of boards and nominating and executive committees). All exchange
rules, which include these listing requirements, must be approved by the SEC. Securities
Exchange Act § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (2006).
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central component of which is a board that consists principally of inde-
pendent directors, including the board chair. 3
2. The Shareholder Franchise and Block Ownership. - Shareholder
meetings and, more specifically, the voting rights exercised at them, pro-
vide the shareholder-owners with an opportunity to select and replace
directors, to approve or reject management initiatives offered for their
consideration, and to present proposals for management's consideration
and otherwise interact directly with management. In recent years, institu-
tional investor activism has focused on the voting governance mechanism
by sponsoring proposals on a variety of governance issues-such as take-
over defenses and executive compensation-as well as by negotiating with
management over the proposals' substance.1 4 Such activism is also con-
nected to the governance mechanism of the board of directors, in that
shareholder proposals often seek to increase the representation of inde-
pendent directors on the board, although the current emphasis has been
directed at the number of votes required to elect directors.
Shareholders owning significant blocks of stock (blockholders) are
often separately characterized in the academic literature as a mechanism
of corporate governance. 15 As the cost of a blockholder's activism is
more likely to be recouped by the pro rata benefits obtained-because it
is spread over more shares-blockholders are better able to use their
ownership to monitor managers than are small shareholders. The most
acute example of the working of this governance mechanism is the hos-
tile takeover, as a takeover results in a complete concentration of owner-
ship and control that fully internalizes the costs and benefits of the
agency problem. Concomitantly, even the threat of a takeover can func-
tion as a mechanism to discipline managers. Thus, institutions that not
only create blocks but also facilitate control changes are often character-
ized as critical backstop components of corporate governance: If agency
costs become too high, it will be profitable to take over the firm and con-
centrate control, thereby reducing those costs.
Firms that adopt devices to impede control changes are, accordingly,
conventionally characterized as firms with poor corporate governance,
13. See, e.g., CII Policies, supra note 10, §§ 2.3, .5d, at 3-4 (setting CII policy that
minimum of two-thirds of board should be independent).
14. See Roberta Romano, Less is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a
Valuable Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 Yale J. on Reg. 174, 175-76 (2001)
[hereinafter Romano, Less is More]; cf., e.g., CII Policies, supra note 10, § 2.5a-c, at 3
(outlining ISS policies that directors generally respond to shareholder communications
and votes and that they seek shareholder views on important corporate matters).
15. See, e.g., Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Large Shareholders and Corporate
Control, 94J. Pol. Econ. 461, 463-65 (1986) (modeling how large shareholders, even when
they cannot monitor management themselves, can discipline management by facilitating
takeovers); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J.
Fin. 737, 754-55 (1997) (explaining how large shareholders internalize monitoring costs
and exert pressure on managers by exercising voting rights, and thereby mitigate the
agency problem).
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because the managers of those firms are not subject to the disciplining
force of hostile bids. Correlatively, the absence of such devices is identi-
fied as a feature of good corporate governance. The market for control is
referred to in the literature as an "external" governance mechanism-it is
an institution that disciplines managers but is external to the firm-in
contrast to firms' "internal" governance mechanisms, such as the board
of directors, which are institutions that constrain the agency problem but
that exist within the boundaries of the firm and are thus institutions over
which firms exert greater control.
3. Executive Compensation. - A final important component of firms'
internal governance is executive compensation. There is a well-devel-
oped literature on the fashioning of incentives to achieve consonance
between managers' actions and shareholders' interests through the use of
stock and stock option compensation. 16 Compensation in the form of
stock and stock options has therefore often been emphasized as a key to
improved corporate performance, and such compensation has been the
most substantial component of executive pay for well over a decade.
Even Congress implicitly accepted the governance function of equity-
based executive incentive compensation when it eliminated the corporate
income tax deduction for executive salaries in excess of $1 million, since
the limitation was applicable only to non-incentive-based compensation
(i.e., deductions could still be taken for compensation over $1 million
paid in the form of bonus, stock, or stock options tied to market perform-
ance measures) .17 Moreover, an influential study by Michael Jensen and
Kevin Murphy lent support to this view by documenting what was consid-
ered to be trivial responsiveness of executive compensation to stock per-
16. See, e.g., Bengt Holmstr6m, Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic
Perspective, in Essays in Economics and Management in Honour of Lars Wahlbeck 209,
221-25 (Bj6rn Wahlroos et al. eds., 1982) (modeling principal-agent problem in dynamic
setting and finding that contracts providing for incentive compensation such as options
dependent on outcomes are necessary to induce labor supply and optimal risk-taking);
Bengt Holmstr6m, Moral Hazard and Observability, 10 Bell J. Econ. 74, 81-83 (1979)
(suggesting that where principal is unable to perfectly monitor agent's actions, interests
can be aligned by providing incentive compensation-by adjusting remuneration in
accord with observable information that serves as proxy for information on unobservable
agent conduct).
17. I.R.C. § 162(m) (2006). The provision was enacted as part of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Star. 312 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 7, 12, 20 U.S.C.), at a time of public criticism of executive
compensation. See Nancy L. Rose & Catherine Wolfram, Regulating Executive Pay: Using
the Tax Code to Influence Chief Executive Officer Compensation, 20 J. Lab. Econ. S138,
S139 (2002). Some commentators have attributed the Enron and related corporate
scandals to that legislation, contending that because managers could receive substantial
compensation only in the form of stock and stock options, they had incentives to engage in
accounting manipulation to maintain high stock prices. E.g., Bruce Bartlett, Not So Suite:
Clinton Tax Law Is Problem, Not Greedy Execs, Nat'l Rev. Online, Sept. 25, 2002, at http:/
/www.nationalreview.com/nrof barlett/barlett09250 2 .asp (on file with the Columbia Law
Review).
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formance. 18 Jensen and Murphy viewed this disconnect to be a matter of
considerable policy concern and advocated increasing equity incentive
compensation.1 9
The tide of popular opinion turned against equity- and option-based
compensation after Enron and other corporate accounting scandals
came to light, fueled by repeated assertions in the media from journalists,
commentators, and public and union pension funds that executive com-
pensation was unreasonably high. This turn of events was not an alto-
gether surprising development, as executive compensation has a long his-
tory of being a target of populist press attacks after market declines.2 0
The accounting scandals revived executive compensation as an issue be-
cause some scandal-ridden firms' executives reported gains in the range
of tens to hundreds of millions of dollars from exercising stock options
before their firms imploded, and those gains were then a sore point to,
among others, investors whose stock was worthless and employees whose
jobs were lost. The phenomenon also affected managers whose firms
were not tainted by scandal but who had sizeable gains on option exer-
cises while their shareholders' investments were tanking in the market
decline following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, a decline
that continued throughout the revelations in 2002 of widespread ac-
counting frauds.
Managerial incentive alignment through equity ownership has not,
however, been entirely discredited or jettisoned as an important mecha-
nism of corporate governance by those who consider executive compen-
sation to be excessive. Rather, even the most severe critics of executive
compensation have not advocated elimination of incentive pay but have
instead endorsed structural reforms that give shareholders greater con-
trol over director elections, under the assumption that the outcome will
be lower total compensation and better incentivized equity pay pack-
ages.2 1 In addition, the Council of Institutional Investors (CII), an associ-
18. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management
Incentives, 98J. Pol. Econ. 225, 227 (1990) (calculating that CEO compensation changed
by only $3.25 for a $1,000 change in stock value).
19. See Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much
You Pay, But How, J. Applied Corp. Fin., Fall 1990, at 36, 36.
20. See Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall Street 25-26 (3d ed. 2003)
(describing how critical focus of Pecora hearings that provided basis for federal securities
regulation in 1930s was compensation of bank executives); Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J.
Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives 42-43 (June 4, 1989)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://www-
rcf.usc.edu/-kjmurphy/jmjpe.pdf (updated version published at 98 J. Pol. Econ. 225
(1990)) (listing newspaper headlines from the 1980s attacking high executive
compensation).
21. See Lucian Bebchuk & Jesse Fried, Pay Without Performance 189-216 (2004)
(arguing that such institutional modifications will provide incentives to reduce
compensation by facilitating election of directors who approve either smaller
compensation packages for management or use of incentive compensation keyed to
relative performance rather than general stock market movements).
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ation of pension funds that lobbies on corporate governance, issued a
policy statement on executive compensation that recommends restric-
tions on the form and amount of incentive compensation but not its
abandonment, which has since been incorporated into its statement of
corporate governance policies. 22 Most recently, the focus of institutional
investor activist attention has been to require shareholder approval of the
chief executive officer's (CEO) compensation, by means of shareholder
proposals sponsored most frequently by union funds, an approach that
would be mandated for all public companies under legislation passed in
the U.S. House of Representatives. 23
B. Governance Mechanisms and Firm Performance
Despite widespread belief in the importance of governance mecha-
nisms for resolving agency problems, the empirical literature investigat-
ing the effect of individual corporate governance mechanisms on corpo-
rate performance has not been able to identify systematically positive
effects and is, at best, inconclusive. There have been innumerable studies
examining the impact of board composition on performance, and the
decisive balance of studies has found no relation between director inde-
pendence and performance, whether measured by accounting or stock
return measures. 24 Similarly, most studies seeking to measure the impact
22. See CII Policies, supra note 10, § 5, at 9-17.
23. The Shareholder Vote on Executive Compensation Act, H.R. 1257, 110th Cong.
(2007), was passed on April 20, 2007 by a vote of 269 to 134. 153 Cong. Rec. H3713 (daily
ed. Apr. 20, 2007). The Senate has not acted on the bill.
24. For literature reviews, see, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain
Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. Law. 921,
921-50 (1999); Roberta Romano, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance, 5 Indus. &
Corp. Change 277, 284-90 (1996). In fact, in a few instances, researchers have found a
positive impact on performance from the presence of inside (rather than outside)
directors, and a negative impact of independent directors. See, e.g., Bhagat & Black,
supra, at 944-45 (reporting negative relation between board independence and
performance, driven by poor performance at firms with supermajority-independent
boards, and interpreting results as "suggest[ing] that it may be valuable for boards to
include at least a moderate number of inside directors"); April Klein, Firm Performance
and Board Committee Structure, 41 J.L. & Econ. 275, 300 (1998) (finding positive
correlation between firm performance and insider director participation on certain board
committees). The literature reviews by Bhagat and Black and by Romano also summarize
the results of the many studies examining whether independent boards make different
decisions than nonindependent boards and whether the outcomes benefit shareholders;
the data are mixed, with occasional examples of independent boards outperforming
nonindependent ones. See Bhagat & Black, supra, at 923-40; Romano, supra, at 290-97.
For example, studies have found a higher probability of a CEO's termination after poor
performance and positive stock price effects from the adoption of poison pills when a
majority of directors are independent. See James A. Brickley et al., Outside Directors and
the Adoption of Poison Pills, 35J. Fin. Econ. 371, 372 (1994) (finding that "average stock-
price reaction to poison-pill adoptions is significantly positive when the board is controlled
by outside directors and significantly negative when it is not"); Michael S. Weisbach,
Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 431, 453 (1988) (finding that
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on performance of shareholder activism through shareholder proposals
find no significant stock price effect from that activity.2 5 When negotia-
tions over proposals that result in a proposal's withdrawal have been stud-
ied, the findings are inconsistent with respect to statistical significance,
varying with proposal and proponent type, among other factors. 26 At the
other end of the activism spectrum, however, proxy fights for board seats
have significant positive price effects, regardless of whether challengers
succeed. 27 The incentive effect from having to spend substantial re-
sources of one's own to engage in such challenges and the more signifi-
cant organizational consequences that result from such costly efforts no
doubt explain the differential performance effect of this activity.
The relation between voting rights and performance has not been as
extensively studied as that of board composition, at least in part because
most governance activists have focused their attention on the board.
However, studies do show, not surprisingly, that voting rights are econom-
ically quite valuable: While differential voting rights are not particularly
prevalent among U.S. firms, studies of corporations issuing dual-class
stock find significant premia accorded to the voting shares where both
classes trade. 28 Moreover, there is some evidence that the closer voting
rights approximate one share-one vote-that is, the closer the fraction of
insiders' voting rights is to their fraction of economic ownership (divi-
dend rights)-the higher the value of the firm.2 9
Because voting rights run with ownership, studies investigating the
relation between ownership and performance can be viewed-at least in
firms with only one class of stock-as equivalent to examining the rela-
tion between voting rights and performance. Several such studies have
found nonlinear relations between insider stock ownership and perform-
ance. 30 That is, for small-scale blocks there are positive valuation effects,
"outside boards rely more frequently than inside boards on performance ... when making
removal decisions").
25. For literature reviews, see Bernard Black, Shareholder Activism and Corporate
Governance in the United States, in 3 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the
Law 459, 459-64 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Romano, Less is More, supra note 14, at
176-82. The results in the literature are mixed concerning whether shareholder proposals
result in firms undertaking significant structural changes or governance reforms. Romano,
Less is More, supra note 14, at 219-21.
26. See Romano, Less is More, supra note 14, at 209-19 (reviewing empirical
literature on proposal negotiations).
27. See id. at 182, 221-22.
28. See, e.g., Luigi Zingales, What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?, 110 Q.J.
Econ. 1047, 1053-55, 1059 (1995) (modeling and providing evidence that superior voting
shares bear higher market premia).
29. Paul A. Gompers et al., Extreme Governance: An Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in
the United States 40 (Rodney L. White Ctr. for Fin. Research, Working Paper No. 12-04,
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=562511 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Gompers et al., Extreme Governance]. The
relation is significant in only some model formulations.
30. See, e.g., John J. McConnell & Henri Servaes, Additional Evidence on Equity
Ownership and Corporate Value, 27 J. Fin. Econ. 595, 601, 604 (1990) [hereinafter
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presumably from monitoring. As control increases, however, the benefits
from blockholding decrease, either because there are no economies of
scale from blockholding or because the benefits are offset by potential
expropriation (the thesis often advanced in the academic literature).3 l
In either scenario, lower firm values result.
A similar relation has not, however, been consistently detected for
outside block ownership. 3 2 A comprehensive study of relational investing
(outsiders holding large blocks for the long term) did not identify a sys-
tematic positive performance effect: The relation was positive only in the
late 1980s when the level of hostile takeover activity was high.33 There
have been other efforts at measuring the benefit of outside blockholding
as a governance device that have identified stronger results: Several stud-
ies have found positive price effects upon the formation of outsider
blocks.3 4 Those findings can be reconciled with the results of the rela-
McConnell & Servaes, Additional Evidence]; Randall Morck et al., Management
Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20J. Fin. Econ. 293, 308, 311-12
(1988). There is some evidence of a similar nonlinear effect for dual class firms as well.
Gompers et al., Extreme Governance, supra note 29, at 34-35. In Part II we discuss a
serious methodological issue regarding these studies' tests: the endogeneity between
inside ownership and the valuation measure used in the studies.
31. See Morck et al., supra note 30, at 293-94 (listing articles adopting offsetting
expropriation thesis).
32. Compare McConnell & Servaes, Additional Evidence, supra note 30, at 601-02
(finding no relation), with Morck et al., supra note 30, at 308 (finding nonlinear relation,
positive for small blocks of outside directors and negative for large blocks). But in a study
controlling for growth opportunities, McConnell and Servaes then found a similar
nonlinear relation holds for outside as for inside blockholdings. SeeJohnJ. McConnell &
Henri Servaes, Equity Ownership and the Two Faces of Debt, 39J. Fin. Econ. 131, 153-54
(1995).
33. Sanjai Bhagat et al., Relational Investing and Firm Performance, 27J. Fin. Res. 1, 2
(2004) [hereinafter Bhagat et al., Relational Investing] (examining relational investing
over thirteen-year period from 1983-1995).
34. For a literature review, see, e.g., Gregg A. Jarrell et al., The Market for Corporate
Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2J. Econ. Persp. 49, 63 (1988) (examining
results on block formation). These studies were of greenmail, the takeover defensive tactic
in which corporations repurchase potential bidders' shares at a premium not available to
other shareholders, to thwart a hostile bid; the positive price effects upon the
announcement of the formation of the repurchased blocks outweighed the negative price
effects upon the announcement of the blocks' repurchase. Similarly, more recent studies
of the impact of hedge-fund block ownership find positive price effects on the
announcement of the initial block investment or the initiation of activism, or both, while
much of their activism takes the form of proxy fights or otherwise results in firm-level
changes, such as CEO turnover, increased payouts, and improved operating performance.
See Alon Bray et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance,
63J. Fin. 1729, 1730-31 (2008); April Klein & Emanuel Zur, Entrepreneurial Shareholder
Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors, 64J. Fin. (forthcoming Feb. 2009),
available at http://www.afajof.org/afa/forthcoming/4442.pdf (manuscript at 24-28, on
file with the Columbia Law Review); Nicole M. Boyson & Robert M. Mooradian, Hedge
Funds as Shareholder Activists from 1994-2005, at 13-15 (July 31, 2007) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=
992739; Nick A. Stokman, Influences of Hedge Fund Activism on the Medium Term
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tional investor study, in that the blocks whose formation was under study
in the former research were held by investors with reputations for engag-
ing in hostile acquisitions. 35 The source of the gains in both studies, ac-
cordingly, appears to be related to the same phenomenon of corporate
restructuring: in the case of block formations, market expectations of
potential takeover premia, which incorporate gains acquirers expect to
recoup from restructuring; and, in the case of relational investments,
blockholders "encourag[ing] restructuring that translated... into better
stock market performance."
36
The literature on the performance effects of insider stock ownership,
particularly in relation to executive compensation, is less extensive than
that on board composition. A few studies have found a positive price
effect from the announcement of adoption of stock-option compensation
plans, 3 7 and other studies have found a positive relation between man-
agement compensation, particularly the equity component, and perform-
ance. 3 8 Studies of the impact of director stock ownership similarly have
ambiguous findings; in part the difference depends on the ownership cal-
culation. While some studies found no significant relation between per-
formance and ownership, calculated as the percentage of shares owned
by outside directors,39 Sanjai Bhagat and Brian Bolton found a significant
positive relation, using the dollar value of the stock ownership of the me-
dian outside director as the governance measure. 40 They provide two ra-
Target Firm Value 48-55 (Aug. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia
Law Review), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1019968.
35. See Jarrell et al., supra note 34, at 52.
36. Bhagat et al., Relational Investing, supra note 33, at 27.
37. See Richard A. DeFusco et al., The Effect of Executive Stock Option Plans on
Stockholders and Bondholders, 45J. Fin. 617, 617 (1990); Angela G. Morgan & Annette B.
Poulsen, Linking Pay to Performance-Compensation Proposals in the S&P 500, 62J. Fin.
Econ. 489, 504-07 (2001). But see James A. Brickley et al., The Impact of Long-Range
Managerial Compensation Plans on Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. Acct. & Econ. 115, 123-28
(1985) (showing positive stock-price effect from introduction of long-term compensation
plans but no significant differences in positive stock-price effect among differing types of
plans, including those with option component); Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas,
When Is Enough, Enough? Market Reaction to Highly Dilutive Stock Option Plans and the
Subsequent Impact on CEO Compensation, 11 J. Corp. Fin. 61, 67-69 (2005) (finding
insignificant stock price effects for full sample of plans, but significant negative reaction to
plans with high levels of potential dilution).
38. See Hamid Mehran, Executive Compensation Structure, Ownership, and Firm
Performance, 38 J. Fin. Econ. 163, 176-77 (1995) (finding positive relation between
performance and equity compensation); Kevin Murphy, Corporate Performance and
Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical Analysis, 7 J. Acct. & Econ. 11, 25-40 (1985)
(finding positive relation between performance and total compensation).
39. See, e.g., Mehran, supra note 38.
40. See Sanjai Bhagat & Brian Bolton, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance,
14J. Corp. Fin. 257, 266-67 (2008). Because most boards today consist almost entirely of
independent directors, the median voter on the board is almost certain to be an outside
director. See James S. Linck et al., The Determinants of Board Structure, 87J. Fin. Econ.
308, 315-16 (2008) (reporting that, for 6,931 firms from 1990 to 2004, the average board
had 66% outsiders, with only 22% of firms having majority of insiders-the respective
HeinOnline -- 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1817 2008
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
tionales for the merits of their ownership metric. First, it is theoretically
consistent with the political economy literature that identifies the median
voter as the key (marginal) decisionmaker. Second, it is a more plausible
benchmark for measuring the incentive effects of ownership because "di-
rectors, as economic agents, are more likely to focus on policies' impact
on the dollar value of their holdings in the company rather than on the
percentage owne[d] ."41
In sum, the empirical literature focusing on individual governance
mechanisms has not consistently identified a relation between govern-
ance and performance. Nevertheless, the appropriate conclusion to draw
from this extensive line of research is not that efforts at improving corpo-
rate governance are nearly always a waste of time and effort. Rather,
there are limitations with a research design that examines the effect on
performance of only one dimension of a firm's governance when govern-
ance mechanisms are numerous and interaction effects are quite proba-
ble. That is, no doubt, a factor contributing to the attention directed at
governance indices, which combine multiple governance dimensions into
one number. In all likelihood, however, the more compelling reason for
the success of indices is the elegant simplicity of having one summary
number for capturing the multiple dimensionality of governance. 42
percentages for large firms being 73% and 9%, and for small firms 58% and 36%).
Moreover, given most firms' policies on director stock ownership-mandating a targeted
ownership amount within five years of appointment, see, e.g., McDonald's Corp., Stock
Ownership Guidelines for Directors 1 (2007), at http://mcdonaldsemail.com/corp/
invest/gov/ownership-guide/director_stock.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(stating older, New York Stock Exchange-listed company's guidelines requiring that
directors "own McDonald's stock equal in value to the lesser of five times the annual cash
Board retainer or ten thousand shares within five years ofjoining the Board"); NETGEAR,
Inc., Stock Ownership Guidelines 1 (2005), at http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/
NTGR/0x0x92124/8b3d1703-9706-46f6-a7e7-66cd66c66240/StockOwnershipGuidelines.
pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (stating newer, NASDAQ-traded company's
guidelines requiring that directors hold at least 5,000 shares within five years of
appointment)-unless there is wide variation in the year of appointment on a board, there
is not likely to be large variation in the size of the holdings across the outside directors
(excluding, of course, a director employed by an outside blockholder, whose shares are
attributed to the individual). See David Yermack, Remuneration, Retention, and
Reputation Incentives for Outside Directors, 59J. Fin. 2281, 2285-87 (2004) (finding that
new directors hold few shares compared to directors on board more than five years and
that over twenty-five percent of directors serve on board less than five years).
41. Bhagat & Bolton, supra note 40, at 260. The incentive effect can be illustrated by
the following simple example. Suppose that Director A owns a 0.01% equity stake in a $10
billion company, while Director B owns a 0.1% equity stake in a $100 million company. A's
stake equates to a $1 million equity ownership, whereas B's stake equates to a $100,000
equity ownership. All other things being equal, A is likely to devote more time and
attention to her board responsibilities than is B.
42. The import of this feature of indices is discussed further infra Part III.
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C. Aggregated Measures of Corporate Governance: Governance Indices
The corporate governance indices that are currently in use by aca-
demics and commercial vendors vary considerably with respect to which
features of firms' corporate governance are deemed sufficiently impor-
tant to be included. The initial foray into creating an index was an aca-
demic inquiry. But the line of research rapidly generated commercial
products that are marketed primarily to institutional investors seeking in-
formation about the quality of firms' corporate governance, as well as to
firms wishing to signal governance quality to investors. Because our anal-
ysis of comparative performance of governance indices focuses on aca-
demic indices, we devote greater attention to those indices than to com-
mercial products.
1. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick's G-Index. - The creation of firm-level
corporate governance indices began with GIM's research, which was pub-
lished in 200343 but widely circulated in 2001. 44 GIM constructed their
index from data on the governance characteristics of over 1,000 firms,
including most large public corporations (the Fortune 500 and Standard
& Poor's 500), compiled by the Investor Responsibility Research Center
(IRRC), a nonprofit research group that served institutional investors. 45
Because IRRC's clients had become active in corporate governance in
order to oppose takeover defenses in the 1980s, most of the governance
features tracked by the IRRC are defensive tactics. The features consist of
twenty-two provisions in firms' corporate documents (seventeen of which
are takeover-related) and six types of state takeover statutes, resulting in
twenty-four distinct items after accounting for overlaps between tracked
provisions and statutes. 46 The firm-level provisions tend to cluster: That
is, correlations across most of the twenty-two firm-level provisions are pos-
itive, many significantly so. 47
From these data, GIM constructed a governance index that they con-
sidered to reflect the "balance of power between shareholders and man-
43. Paul Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q.J. Econ. 107
(2003) [hereinafter Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices].
44. Gompers et al., Corporate Governance Working Paper, supra note 4.
45. See Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, supra note 43, at
109-11.
46. The specific provisions are identified in Appendix A. GIM note that they
supplemented the IRRC firm-level data for coverage under takeover statutes with other
sources on state statutes. Id. at 112-13. The publication years of IRRC governance data
were 1990, 1993, 1995, and 1998. Id. at 110. In the analysis relating governance to
performance, because index values were not available for years when no data were
collected, GIM only reset the governance portfolios in the four publication years, which is
equivalent to using the values from the last available IRRC volume for the missing years.
Id. at 124 tbl.7. The IRRC obtained the governance data from public information sources,
such as SEC filings, and the number of firms covered increased over the period. Id. at
110-11.
47. Of 231 total pairwise correlations, 169 were positive, and of those 111 were
significant, whereas only nine of the remaining sixty-two negative correlations were
significant. Id. at 111.
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agers.' '48 Relying on the IRRC's judgment as to which corporate govern-
ance mechanisms investors considered to be important, GIM added up
the number of provisions that each firm had of the twenty-four items,
assigning one point for each provision that they viewed as restricting
shareholder rights, and one point for the absence of either of two provi-
sions that they viewed as constraining manager power and thereby en-
hancing shareholder rights. 49 GIM thus equally weighted the governance
features tracked by IRRC in fashioning their measure of corporate gov-
ernance quality. The sum of the components is the "Governance Index"
or "G index" (G-Index).
GIM grouped sample firms into ten portfolios in relation to their G-
Index scores, approximating deciles of governance quality.50 They then
examined the relation between the firms' governance quality and several
measures of performance: stock returns; Tobin's Q and three account-
ing measures-net profit margin, return on equity, and sales growth. 5 1
The examination of the relation between corporate governance and per-
formance focused on a comparison between the highest and lowest G-
Index portfolios, which they called the "Dictatorship" and "Democracy"
portfolios, respectively. 52 GIM found a significant relation between the
governance index and stock returns and Tobin's Q: Firms with the
poorest corporate governance consistently underperformed those with
the best corporate governance. In particular, quantifying the effect, the
impact of governance on performance appeared to be substantial: An
investment strategy of buying the Democracy portfolio stocks and selling
the Dictatorship portfolio stocks would have earned abnormal returns of
8.5% a year; or a one-point increase in G was associated with an 11.4%
decrease in Tobin's Q by the end of the sample period.
Finding a relation between the G-Index and subsequent perform-
ance does not, of itself, indicate that better corporate governance caused
superior performance. GIM considered three possible explanations of
their finding: (1) investors underestimated the cost of poor governance
at the outset of the period under study (1990, the first year of the sam-
48. Id. at 109.
49. Id.
50. We use the phrase "approximate" deciles because the number of firms in each of
the ten portfolios is not identical. See id. at 116 tbl.2.
51. Id. at 119, 129. Stock returns are computed using a standard four-factor model
that adjusts individual stock returns for market movements, size and market-to-book factor
returns, and momentum effects. Tobin's Q is the ratio of a firm's market value to the
replacement cost of its assets (in practice computed from book values); ratios greater than
one suggest that a firm is generating excess profits and therefore is a good performer. The
computation of Tobin's Q and the accounting measures are industry-adjusted.
52. Although the G-Index has a potential range of zero to twenty-four, the actual
range is from two to seventeen, with higher scores indicating lower quality; the mean and
median G-Index score are nine. Id. at 116. The portfolio cutoffs are (1) less than six for
the "Democracy" portfolio, consisting of firms with the strongest shareholder rights; (2)
each of six through thirteen; and (3) greater than thirteen for the "Dictatorship" portfolio,
consisting of firms with the weakest shareholder rights. Id. at 115-16.
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ple); (2) managers expecting poor performance in the 1990s adopted
governance devices in the 1980s that would restrict shareholder rights
(i.e., features that GIM, along with the IRRC, consider to be poor corpo-
rate governance); and (3) poor governance is correlated with other un-
specified firm characteristics that caused the firms' subsequent abnormal
performance in the 1990s. They attempted to test which hypothesis was
correct and found some evidence supporting the first and the third hy-
potheses (industry classification explained between one-sixth to one-third
of the abnormal performance). 53 They concluded with an appropriately
cautionary statement that called for further study to determine which hy-
pothesis is correct because of the hypotheses' "starkly different policy
implications. 54
2. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell's E-Index. - Lucian Bebchuk, Alma
Cohen, and Allen Ferrell (BCF) advanced a competing governance index
to the G-Index, one composed of a subset of G-Index factors.5 5 Ac-
cepting as the most probable explanation of GIM's results that corporate
governance positively affects performance, BCF sought to construct what
they regarded to be a better-motivated index in relation to theory and
intuition regarding the efficacy of particular defenses. They selected the
six IRRC takeover-defense provisions that they considered to contribute
the most to managerial entrenchment.5 6 These provisions included
poison pills and staggered boards-the combination of which Bebchuk
had previously emphasized was the most potent of takeover defenses 57-
as well as golden parachutes. BCF's inclusion of golden parachutes as
one of the more formidable defenses is, however, problematic because
there is a theoretical and empirical literature that, at odds with BCF's
contention, suggests that golden parachutes in fact facilitate takeovers. 58
In constructing their index, BCF followed GIM's approach, accord-
ing equal weight (one point) to the presence of any of the six provi-
sions. 59 The index is called the "Entrenchment Index" or "E-Index."
BCF expected their index to outperform GIM's as a predictor of corpo-
rate performance because the E-Index contained the provisions that, in
53. Id. at 132-43.
54. Id. at 145.
55. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., What Matters in Corporate Governance? 1-3 (Harvard
Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Discussion Paper No. 491, 2005),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstractid=593423 (on file with the
Columbia Law Review) [hereinafter Bebchuk et al., Corporate Governance].
56. Id. at 7. Appendix A contains the details of the six provisions.
57. See Lucian Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards:
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887, 887 (2002).
58. See, e.g., David Baron, Tender Offers and Management Resistance, 38J. Fin. 331,
340 (1983) (outlining theoretical model in which golden parachutes encourage hostile
bids); Richard Lambert & Donald Larcker, Golden Parachutes, Executive Decision-Making
and Shareholder Wealth, 7J. Acct. & Econ. 179, 192-96, 200-01 (1985) (finding positive
price effects upon adoption of golden-parachute defense).
59. Bebchuk et al., Corporate Governance, supra note 55, at 13.
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BCF's view, were most likely to thwart a hostile takeover.60 The six provi-
sions that BCF identified as most entrenching turned out to be the only
ones of the twenty-four components of the G-Index that were statistically
significant in regressions on performance when the estimation was sepa-
rately undertaken for each component. 6' Accordingly, BCF concluded
that the correlation between governance and performance in GIM's study
was driven entirely by the subset of governance factors in the E-Index.
Examining the relation between the E-Index and industry-adjusted
Tobin's Q and stock returns (the same performance measures used by
GIM but with a few more years of available data), BCF confirmed the
correlation between governance and future performance found in GIM's
study.62 They also confirmed GIM's finding that a portfolio of low en-
trenchment/good governance (GIM's Democracy) firms outperformed a
portfolio of high entrenchment/poor governance (GIM's Dictatorship)
firms.63
BCF concluded that the E-Index is preferable as a measure of the
quality of a firm's corporate governance to the G-Index: It is more parsi-
monious, is better motivated, and it outperforms the G-Index. 64 Al-
though GIM's governance index has been extensively used in the aca-
demic literature while BCF's index has not, BCF's index has made some
commercial inroads. Glass, Lewis & Company, which provides research
and advisory services to institutional investors, markets a governance
ranking termed the "Board Accountability Index" that is derived from
BCF's research. The Board Accountability Index uses five of the six com-
ponents of the E-Index, and Glass Lewis markets it as derived from the
"fact" that "good governance can improve shareholder returns. ' 65 BCF
60. Given the later date of BCF's study, they had two more years of IRRC governance
data than GIM had. For years when no IRRC volume was published, BCF equated firms'
index value to the value from the last published volume, as did GIM. As both GIM and
BCF noted, this assumes that firms' governance provisions are unchanged over the interval
between IRRC publication. Id. at 15.
61. Id. at 22-24.
62. Id. at 27-39.
63. Id.
64. See id. at 4-7.
65. Glass, Lewis & Co., Board Accountability Index: Governance-Enhanced S&P 500
Index (2008), at http://www.glasslewis.com/solutions/bai.php (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) [hereinafter Glass, Lewis & Co., BAI]. Glass Lewis further describes its
governance index, whose use it advocates for formulating an investment strategy, as
follows:
Investing in companies with good governance can improve shareholder returns,
as many have suspected for years. This is no longer just a matter of intuition. It's
a fact. A study by Harvard Law School professor Lucian Bebchuk and his
colleagues identified a statistically significant and strong correlation, over a long
period of time, between stock performance and the degree to which boards are
accountable to their shareholders. Based on this research, Professor Bebchuk
and Dr. Cohen, in collaboration with Glass, Lewis & Co., have developed a
governance-enhanced S&P 500 index, the Board Accountability Index (BAI).
The BAI consists of all companies in the S&P 500. It uses a modified market-cap
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were more cautious regarding the use of their results than are Glass
Lewis, however. BCF did not conclude that they had demonstrated causa-
tion; rather, they stated that the evidence was "suggestive" that the set of
entrenching governance provisions that they had identified affects
performance. 66
3. Brown and Caylor's Gov-Score Index. - Lawrence Brown and Marcus
Caylor created a more extensive governance index than the G and E indi-
ces, using firm-level governance information obtained from ISS.6 7 Brown
and Caylor's index, which they call "Gov-Score," is a sum of fifty-one fac-
tors (a subset of the sixty-one factors and three combination measures
collected by ISS)-nine are in the G-Index, and a tenth, incorporation in
a state with a takeover statute, is a composite of the four state-takeover-
statute components of the G-Index. 68 Following BCF's refinement of the
G-Index, Brown and Caylor also constructed "Gov-7," a subindex consist-
ing of seven of the components in Gov-Score. 69
The Gov-Score index has the potential advantage, noted by its cre-
ators, of providing a superior measure of firms' governance quality be-
cause it includes a broader set of components of corporate governance
than takeover defenses, which comprise the bulk of the G and E indi-
ces.70 It is also derived from a larger database than the other two indices
(over 2,000 firms). But it does have a comparative disadvantage: It was
constructed from only one year of data (2003, the first year in which ISS
began collecting the information), in contrast to the multiple years of
IRRC data used for the G and E indices. On the other hand, because
Gov-Score uses 2003 data, it measures firms' corporate governance char-
acteristics in the post-Enron environment, in contrast to the other two
weighting algorithm that adjusts a company's weight based on the presence or
absence of five critical corporate governance features identified in the study of
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell.
Id. The provision from the BCF index that Glass Lewis omits is a supermajority
requirement (hence a restriction) on charter amendments. See id.
66. Bebchuk et al., Corporate Governance, supra note 55, at 40.
67. Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm
Valuation, 25 J. Acct. & Pub. Pol'y 409, 411 (2006).
68. Id. at 414-15 & nn.13-14. Gov-Score thus can range from zero to fifty-one, but as
with the G-Index, the actual range-from thirteen to thirty-eight-is substantially narrower
than the theoretical range. The mean score of sample firms is 22.52, with a standard
deviation of 3.45. Id. at 416. Brown and Caylor used a point system that is the opposite of
GIM and BCF, assigning one point to "acceptable," as opposed to "unacceptable,"
corporate governance practices: Consequently, a higher Gov-Score signifies higher quality
corporate governance, in contrast to G- and E-Index values. Id. at 414-15. Appendix A
details the composition of the Gov-Score index.
69. The components in Gov-7 were identified empirically from the factors that were
most strongly correlated with performance. Id. at 411, 418-23. Two of the seven
components are takeover defenses also in the G and E indices. See infra Appendix A.
70. See Brown & Caylor, supra note 67, at 411.
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indices, which are derived from pre-Enron data. Gov-Score is therefore
arguably more germane for contemporary policy considerations. 71
Brown and Caylor examined the relation between Gov-Score and
Tobin's Q one of the two performance measures emphasized by GIM
and BCF. They did not adjust performance by industry, as GIM and BCF
did, nor did they examine stock returns. They found that Gov-Score is
significantly positively related to Tobin's Q-i.e., that superior perform-
ance is associated with higher quality governance. 72
A major difference between Brown and Caylor's findings and those
of the other two studies is the relation between takeover defenses and
performance. Brown and Caylor found that the board and compensation
factors in their index were more highly associated with good perform-
ance than were most of the takeover defenses, 73 which are the principal
components of the G and E indices. They then disaggregated the index
and found that a subset of the fifty-one components drove the significant
correlation between Gov-Score and Tobin's Q.74 Identifying seven ele-
ments as consistently significant, Brown and Caylor used those seven to
form the Gov-7 governance index, which they analogized to BCF's
E-Index-both being parsimonious subsets of larger, related indices.
Brown and Caylor then investigated which of the two indices had greater
predictive power, and, after eliminating the overlapping provisions (two
components were in both the E-Index and Gov-7), they found that Gov-7
still had explanatory power while the E-Index did not.75 Brown and
Caylor were careful not to attribute causation to their findings. But they
did conclude that it is preferable to use a small index of factors capturing
more governance dimensions than simply takeover defenses as a measure
of governance quality.
7 6
4. Proprietary Governance Indices. - The commercial indices ranking
public corporations' governance quality, which are provided by proxy re-
search and advisory services, 77 differ distinctively from the academic indi-
71. The commercialization of governance ratings, discussed infra Part I.C.4, has led
both the IRRC and ISS to compile governance data more frequently: The IRRC data
available online have been biennially updated, and the ISS data for its proprietary product
are annually updated and have been backfilled to 2001.
72. Brown & Caylor, supra note 67, at 430.
73. See id. at 418-22.
74. See id. at 422-23.
75. See id. at 427.
76. In this regard they considered their work as confirming the finding in K.J. Martijn
Cremers & Vinay B. Nair, Governance Mechanisms and Equity Prices, 60 J. Fin. 2859
(2005), discussed infra Part II.A.3, that it is a combination of internal and external
governance mechanisms that relate governance to performance. Brown & Caylor, supra
note 67, at 430.
77. Commercial providers of proxy services whose governance measures are jointly
summarized are ISS, Egan-Jones Proxy Services, GovernanceMetrics International, and The
Corporate Library (TCL). Details on the specifics of these governance indices are
discussed infra Appendix A. The proxy services offered by the firms vary, and include:
research and recommendations on proxy voting, automated vote execution,
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ces on several important dimensions. First, firms' scores on the proprie-
tary indices do not consist of summations of equally weighted factors.
Rather, commercial index providers vary the weights accorded different
governance factors, using either their discretion regarding the impor-
tance of the factor or quantitative analyses to determine the appropriate
weights. 78 Second, commercial indices deemphasize takeover defenses,
in contrast to the indices constructed by GIM and BCF; for example,
some do not even include defenses as a governance factor, while others
place greater weights on the non-takeover-related factors (internal gov-
ernance measures such as board and executive compensation attrib-
utes). 79 Third, some commercial indices are relative rankings of firms in
relation to other firms in their industry, market, or geographic region,
whereas the academic indices are absolute rankings of governance quality
independent of the practices of comparable firms.80 Finally, the leading
provider by far of this type of service, ISS, updates the factors in its index
to capture trends in corporate governance. For example, it recently in-
corporated two items that have become the focus of activist institutional
investor attention-majority voting for directors and option backdat-
ing-while eliminating option expensing (since expensing is now
required) .81
recordkeeping, and disclosure reporting for institutional investors. Some firms, and in
particular the dominant market player, ISS, also provide governance and proxy consulting
services to issuers.
78. See, e.g., GovernanceMetrics Int'l, Research Methodology, at http://www.gmi
ratings.com/ (hgwaa055hjyiu55scbird45)/about.aspx#methodology (last visited Sept. 24,
2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing GovernanceMetrics's overall
rating derived from sophisticated statistical algorithm assigning weights to various
individual metrics in relation to other firms in its universe); ISS Overview, supra note 5, at
I (describing how ISS assigns weights to components of its Corporate Governance
Quotient as function of their correlations with several measures of firm performance).
79. See Appendix A for details on the components of the commercial indices, which
include numerous factors besides defenses. The governance index of the newest entrant
into the market, Egan-Jones, does not even contain an express reference to takeover
defenses. See, e.g., Egan-Jones Proxy Servs., Proxy Report (ID#2731), at http://ejproxy.
com/client/report -display.aspx?report jid=2731 (last visited Sept. 24, 2008) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (describing corporate governance rating for China Mobile
(Hong Kong) Ltd.); Egan-Jones Proxy Servs., Proxy Report (ID#2829), at http://ejproxy.
com/client/report-display.aspx?report id=2829 (last visited Sept. 24, 2008) (on file with
the Columbia Law Review) (describing corporate governance rating for Research in Motion
Ltd.). Glass Lewis's index-which is derived from BCF's work, Glass, Lewis & Co., BAI,
supra note 65, and is therefore not summarized in this section-is the one exception,
consisting solely of takeover defenses.
80. As described infra Appendix A, this is true of the ratings provided by
GovernanceMetrics and ISS.
81. Press Release, Institutional S'holder Servs., Institutional Shareholder Services
Releases New CGQ® Ratings Criteria (Nov. 13, 2006) (on file with the Columbia Law
Review). The constant tweaking of the index could explain why ISS's discussion of the
"performance metrics" used to determine the weights in the corporate governance
quotient suggests that many of the correlations between its index's components and firm
performance measures are high. E.g., ISS Overview, supra note 5, at I ("[T]he higher the
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The difference in index construction across academic and commer-
cial creators can be best explained as a function of both expertise, which
commercial providers believe they possess, and a differing analytical ap-
proach to governance. The academic index constructors intentionally
sought not to make choices regarding the weights assigned to governance
attributes. The rationale for this choice is twofold. First, they do not
hold themselves out to be experts in assessing governance quality, com-
pared to the vendors from which they acquired the data. Second, given
the absence of a theoretical model relating attributes to performance,
equally weighting attributes identified by third-party governance experts
plausibly immunizes their work from charges of "stacking the deck." By
contrast, commercial vendors are actively marketing governance exper-
tise and would be expected to exercise judgment on the weights accorded
to the different components of an index as well as across firms, and, of
course, do not operate under the canons of scholarly research. Expertise
is, for example, underscored in the marketing strategy of The Corporate
Library (TCL). TCL emphasizes its staff of experts82 and that its govern-
ance ratings are not based on "compliance with best practices checkl-
ists"83 but rather on a proprietary set of quantitative screens that are "re-
fined" by their researchers' "in-depth analysis."'8 4
II. Is THERE A RELATION BETWEEN GOVERNANCE QUALITY
AND PERFORMANCE?
Although the development of academic governance indices has
given vitality to, if not sparked, the flourishing of a commercial govern-
ance-index market, the academic literature that introduced indices has
rating factor's correlation significance with specific performance measures, the relatively
higher weight allocated for the rating issue. The lower the correlation significance
between the rating issue and the performance metrics, the lower the weight assigned to the
rating factor."). That suggestion is in contrast to Brown and Caylor's finding that only a
few of the ISS attributes were highly correlated with their performance measures. See
Brown & Caylor, supra note 67, at 422-23.
82. TCL advertises itself as providing "[e]xpert corporate governance research and
advisory services" and having researchers that are "leaders in the fields of corporate
governance and executive compensation policy and practice." The Corp. Library,
Corporate Governance: Independent Information and Analysis, at http://www.the
corporatelibrary.com/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
83. The Corp. Library, Assessment, supra note 5.
84. The Corp. Library, About, supra note 5. In addition, Paul Rose considers the
subjectivity of TCL's rating to be one of its more attractive features, compared to the
"objective" quantitative approach of other indices. See Rose, supra note 7, at 907-15.
Rose further suggests a subtle explanation for the difference between TCL's subjective
approach to governance and the more objective, checklist approach underlying other
commercially provided measures: the fact that TCL does not offer consulting services to
corporations while the other vendors (such as Glass Lewis and ISS) do. In his view,
commercial vendors opt for an objective ranking in order to mitigate the potential conflict
of interest in providing both ranking and consulting services, since by using objective
criteria, it could be easier to support the "claim that [the] governance analysis is not
affected by the provision of other services." Id. at 907.
1826 [Vol. 108:1803
HeinOnline -- 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1826 2008
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDICES
not satisfactorily established that there is a causal relation between gov-
ernance and performance. Although GIM, BCF, and Brown and Caylor
found positive associations between their indices' rankings of governance
quality and firm performance, correlations are obviously not causation,
and subsequent work has even questioned whether a positive association
truly exists. After reviewing key research indicating that the findings asso-
ciating governance quality-as measured by the academic indices-with
performance are not robust (i.e., that they do not hold up under further
investigation), we discuss econometric issues that complicate investiga-
tion of the relation between governance and performance. We then sum-
marize the findings of a study by two of us showing that when those
econometric issues are addressed, the relative performance of govern-
ance indices is not always superior to single governance variables in pre-
dicting corporate performance.
A. Robustness of the Relation Identified by Academic Index Creators
GIM's findings of a significant correlation between governance and
performance attracted a great deal of attention,8 5 at least in part because
the overwhelming balance of the literature on individual governance
characteristics until then had not identified a systematic relation to per-
formance. In addition, it appeared from their research that an investor
could profit by trading on firms' publicly disclosed governance character-
istics, a finding inconsistent with a central tenet of modern financial eco-
nomics: market efficiency. Not surprisingly, financial economists there-
fore sought to test the robustness of GIM's findings and of their
explanation of the data. Several of these studies found that neither the
relation between governance and performance nor GIM's explanation of
their data held up when more closely examined. We review three of the
more important studies both to convey a sense of the fragility of GIM's
(and their progeny's) findings of a significant connection between gov-
ernance indices and performance and to inject an element of realism
into policy discussions relating to the adoption of an index-like approach
to corporate governance regulation or investment decisionmaking.
85. For example, the article was cited in fifty articles in the Social Sciences Citation
Index within three years of its 2003 publication (as searched in the Social Sciences
Research database in Westlaw on June 3, 2006). And the rate of citation has not decreased
over time: The article has today been cited in 177 articles in the Social Sciences Citation
Index since its publication (as searched in the ISI Web of Science on September 24, 2008).
Another measure that indicates the work's continued influence is its position on the SSRN
electronic abstract database. As of August 11, 2008, the working paper had over eight
thousand downloads and was the fiftieth most-downloaded paper (of over 150,000 papers
available for downloading); nine months earlier it ranked sixty-third with over six thousand
downloads, and twenty-five months earlier, it ranked 113th with over four thousand
downloads. The article also was awarded the 2002 Geewax, Terker & Company Prize in
Investment Research for the best working paper by the Rodney L. White Center for
Financial Research at the Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.
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1. Lehn, Patro, and Zhao: Causation Runs from Performance to
Governance. - Kenneth Lehn, Sukesh Patro, and Mengxin Zhao (LPZ)
investigated the issue of causality concerning GIM's findings by examin-
ing the relation between firms' performance in the 1980s, a period
before the takeover defenses comprising the G-Index were adopted, and
performance in the 1990s, the period of performance that GIM found
was correlated with the G-Index. 8 6 The idea was that because governance
mechanisms preventing takeovers were not in place in the early 1980s,
valuation measures from that time period could not have been affected
by those governance devices.
LPZ found that, after controlling for performance in the 1980s, the
relation identified by GIM and BCF between governance and Tobin's Q
in the 1990s disappeared. The 1980s Tobin's Q valuations were corre-
lated with both the 1990s governance measures and 1990s valuations. 87
Moreover, a regression to explain the G-Index was run on both lagged
and leading values of Tobin's Q and the lagged valuations from the
1980s explained the governance ratings of the 1990s but the leading valu-
ations from the 1990s did not.8 8 LPZ interpreted these data as support-
ing the hypothesis that causation runs from performance to governance
rather than the other way around, as conjectured by GIM. Namely, firms
with low valuations (poor performers) in the early 1980s adopted defen-
sive tactics in the late 1980s and continued to have low valuations thereaf-
ter in the 1990s.89 LPZ suggested two possible explanations for the asso-
ciation: Either low-valued firms are poorly managed or they have few
growth opportunities and, as a consequence, make attractive takeover
targets.90 In either scenario, the low-valued firms would thereby be more
likely to adopt takeover defenses, which would affect the value of the G-
Index, as opposed to GIM's explanation going in the other direction,
from governance to performance.
2. Core, Guay, and Rusticus: Market Anticipation of Relation Between
Governance and Performance. - John Core, Wayne Guay, and Tjomme
Rusticus (CGR) also questioned GIM's explanation of their findings and
the issue of causation. 91 CGR investigated what they considered a puzzle
in GIM's study: the finding of a significant relation between governance
and performance as measured by stock returns but not by accounting
86. See Kenneth Lehn et al., Governance Indices and Valuation: Which Causes
Which? 1 (Apr. 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=810944.
87. Id. at 5, 13-14.
88. Id. at 19. All of the results reported in the text for the G-Index were the same for
the E-Index.
89. Id. at 12. Of the three hypotheses that GIM proposed to explain their data, this is
the one that they rejected.
90. Id. at 19-20.
91. See John E. Core et al., Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An
Examination of Firm Operating Performance and Investors' Expectations, 61 J. Fin. 655,
655 (2006) [hereinafter Core et al., Weak Governance].
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earnings. They hypothesized that if the explanation for the findings is, as
GIM suggested, that investors misperceived the relation between govern-
ance and performance at the start of the period under study, then the
market should be surprised if earnings are higher than expected for
good-governance firms or lower than expected for poor-governance
firms. CGR also examined a second question, which they considered to
be a further implication of GIM's findings: whether takeover probabili-
ties are higher than expected for good-governance firms or lower than
expected for poor-governance firms.
Using operating return on assets, which CGR asserted the account-
ing literature considers to be the "more powerful measure" of operating
performance, 9 2 rather than GIM's accounting measure of return on eq-
uity, they documented a significant negative relation between operating
performance and the G-Index, in contrast to GIM. 93 Next, to determine
whether the abnormal stock returns were due to investor surprise that
firms with poor governance have lower performance, they examined the
relation between the G-Index and analyst forecasts as well as earnings an-
nouncements. CGR hypothesized that if investors misunderstood the ef-
fect of governance on performance, then they would have been surprised
when the earnings of poorly governed firms were low and well-governed
firms were high relative to forecasted earnings. Over a variety of intervals
(one quarter to five years), CGR found that analysts' forecasts predicted
the poor performance of high G-Index (poor governance) firms. 94 They
also found no difference in stock returns surrounding earnings an-
nouncements between poorly governed and well-governed firms (low and
high G-Index firms, respectively). 9 5 These results suggest, CGR con-
tended, that neither analysts nor investors were surprised by the perform-
ance of firms in relation to their governance. 96 The study therefore re-
futes the investor-misperception hypothesis suggested by GIM.
CGR further concluded that differences in the probability of take-
over, based on completed takeovers for their sample firms, did not ex-
plain the abnormal returns in GIM's study across the two extreme
G-Index portfolios (the Democracy and Dictatorship portfolios). In fact,
the Dictatorship portfolio firms had a higher takeover probability in the
mid-1990s than the Democracy portfolio firms, which had a higher take-
over probability in the early and late 1990s. 97 Moreover, the differences
in annualized probabilities over the entire period were too small to ex-
plain the difference in abnormal returns that GIM reported. Lastly, elim-
inating the acquired firms from the analysis did not eliminate the return
differential across the two portfolios.
92. Id. at 656.
93. See id. at 668.
94. Id. at 671.
95. Id. at 674-76.
96. See id. at 685.
97. Id. at 677.
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What did they propose, then, as the explanation? They suggested
that the GIM result may have been time-specific. In examining the re-
turns on the investment strategy of hedging the two extreme portfolios
(shorting the poor governance firms and buying the good governance
ones), both over the period studied by GIM (1990s) and four subsequent
years (2000-2003), they found that all of the significant abnormal returns
to the trading strategy occurred from 1997-1999 and that the relation did
not hold up in the later interval, 2000-2003.98 In fact, the value of the
hedge portfolio sharply declined in that period (compared to its increase
in GIM's period of study). This is because the returns to the Democracy
portfolio (good governance firms) decreased in the four later years. CGR
therefore concluded that the data did not support the hypothesis that
governance causes performance.
9 9
3. Cremers and Nair: Effect of Interaction of Governance Mechanisms on
Performance. - Finally, Martijn Cremers and Vinay Nair also found that
the relation between the G-Index and performance is not robust. They
studied the relation between the G-Index-which they emphasized is a
score of external governance mechanisms (exposure to the market for
corporate control)-and internal governance (represented by institu-
tional block ownership), building on the governance literature that con-
siders blockholding to be an important monitoring mechanism.' 0 0 They
constructed portfolios of firms sorted according to their rank on the G-
Index and their rank with regard to block ownership, and they examined
the relationship between firms' governance and their performance. 0 1
Cremers and Nair found that the relation between governance and per-
formance identified by GIM was no longer independently significant
when a block ownership variable was included in the analysis.
In particular, they found that neither governance mechanism alone
affected performance but that specific combinations did, an interaction
effect implying that the mechanisms are complements rather than substi-
tutes. 0 2 Specifically, blockholder ownership was important only for firms
98. Id. at 682-83.
99. Id. at 685.
100. Cremers & Nair, supra note 76, at 2859. Block ownership was measured as either
the percentage of shares held by the largest institutional blockholder or the percentage of
shares held by public pension funds considered to be activist investors. Id. at 2863. They
also constructed an Alternative Takeover Index (ATI) that consisted of a subset of G-Index
factors that were the takeover defenses they considered, from their reading of the legal
literature, the more effective mechanisms for preventing hostile bids (blank check
preferred, staggered boards, and either restrictions on shareholders' right to call
shareholder meetings or to act by written consent) in order to minimize any concern that
the C-Index was not properly characterized as solely proxying for external governance. Id.
at 2865. The results were unchanged when firms were ranked by the ATI rather than the
G-Index. Id. at 2878-83.
101. See id. at 2866-72.
102. Id. at 2871-72. A study by Stuart Gillan,Jay Hartzell, and Laura Starks, discussed
infra notes 115-121 and accompanying text, found that a different internal governance
mechanism-the board of directors-substituted for the market for control, as opposed to
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without takeover defenses (lowest quartile G-Index firms), and the ab-
sence of takeover defenses was important only for firms with an active
blockholder (highest quartile of block ownership); those complementary
portfolios were the only portfolios that could be used to create trading
strategies that generated abnormal profits. With more years of perform-
ance data than GIM, Cremers and Nair found no effect on performance
from takeover defenses alone (the G-Index) and concluded that both
forms of corporate governance matter for future performance.
10 3
Cremers and Nair considered several explanations for their finding
in addition to the investor-learning explanation offered by GIM (that in-
vestors did not understand the impact of corporate governance in 1990,
the outset of GIM's data period). The additional explanations include
that the trading strategy's abnormal returns were (1) unrelated to funda-
mental performance and instead derived from the market's view of cor-
porate governance, (2) due to abnormal returns accruing to future
targets or acquirers on the acquisition announcement dates, or (3) associ-
ated with an omitted risk factor that may or may not be related to govern-
ance.1 0 4 To test these hypotheses, they examined the relation between
their two governance variables and other performance measures (ac-
counting measures and Tobin's Q). The findings using accounting mea-
sures duplicated those for stock returns, which they viewed as inconsis-
tent with the first alternative, that governance is unrelated to changes in
performance, although they noted that this did not demonstrate causal-
ity. They also rejected the second hypothesis because when targets and
acquirers were removed from the portfolios the findings were
unchanged.
The results involving Tobin's Q were somewhat different. While
Cremers and Nair found that firms with only one high-quality governance
mechanism (high block ownership or low takeover defenses) did not ex-
hibit abnormal stock returns, they found that those firms had higher
Tobin's Q valuations. 10 5 They interpreted these findings as evidence that
investors "price the importance of each individual governance mecha-
nism correctly," and hence as the explanation for why there were no ab-
normal returns.' 0 6 Considering the findings regarding trading strategies
of the complementary portfolios and the Tobin's Q valuations, they win-
nowed down the plausible explanations of the data to two: GIM's learn-
ing hypothesis or the third alternative involving unspecified risk factors.
To shed some light on which alternative hypothesis might be correct,
they examined the relation between the different combinations of gov-
ernance portfolios and the variability of performance, as a proxy for risk.
the internal governance device examined by Cremers and Nair and found to be a
complement-institutional blockholding.
103. See Cremers & Nair, supra note 76, at 2861-62.
104. See id. at 2883-89.
105. See id. at 2886-89.
106. Id. at 2889.
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They found that the complementary portfolios (those comprised of firms
with high-quality governance on both dimensions) were indeed associ-
ated with more variable performance measures than portfolios where
only one such mechanism of good governance was present. 1117
Cremers and Nair interpreted these data as providing support for
the omitted risk factor explanation of their results, that is, that the abnor-
mal returns from trading on the governance portfolios were an artifact of
the higher discount rate investors applied to these firms because of their
greater risk.108 They concluded that it is the combination of the quality
of a firm's internal and external governance devices that is associated
with superior performance, and not a firm's defenses alone (what GIM's
and BCF's indices measure),1°° a finding, as earlier noted, replicated in
Brown and Caylor's comparative analysis of the Gov-Score and Gov-7
indices.
B. Might a Single Governance Mechanism Be Preferable to an Index?
Methodological Issues with Governance Indices
Although the dominant approach to evaluating the quality of a
firm's corporate governance today is to construct an index comprised of
multiple dimensions of a firm's governance structure, some governance
scholars still consider specific board characteristics to be the critical de-
terminants of corporate governance. 1 0 Board factors are also empha-
sized by the providers of commercial indices over the takeover-related
governance factors emphasized in most academic indices. This raises the
fundamental question whether a single board characteristic can be as ef-
fective a measure of corporate governance as indices that consider multi-
ple measures of corporate charter provisions and board characteristics.
While this is an empirical question, it is plausible on both theoretical and
methodological grounds for a single board characteristic to be superior
to or as effective a measure of corporate governance as an index. If a
single board characteristic can dominate an index as a proxy for good
governance, then it could be a more parsimonious proxy for predicting
performance. Moreover, it would diminish or eliminate the need and/or
attractiveness to institutional investors of using commercial services to
measure a portfolio firm's governance quality. We therefore think it use-
ful to set out the rationale for why a single governance mechanism re-
107. See id. at 2888-89.
108. See id. at 2886.
109. See id. at 2889-90.
110. E.g., Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Boards of Directors as an
Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature, 9 Econ. Pol'y
Rev. 7, 10-11 (2003) [hereinafter Hermalin & Weisbach, Survey] (discussing various
scholars' beliefs in critical importance of board and director independence as components
of firm governance); see also Bhagat & Bolton, supra note 40, at 271 (proposing directors'
stock ownership as key element of firm governance).
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lated to the board might fare at least as well as an index in evaluating a
firm's overall governance quality.
Under what theory of the firm could one characteristic be preferred
to many to describe a firm's quality of governance? Corporate law pro-
vides the board of directors with the authority to make, or at least ratify,
all important firm decisions, including decisions about investment policy,
management compensation policy, and board governance itself. The
board's pivotal role suggests focusing on board attributes in order to
identify a single governance variable that might serve as an alternative to
an index. It is both theoretically possible and intuitively plausible that an
independent board, or board members with stock ownership, will have
adequate incentives to oversee important corporate decisions and moni-
tor management action implementing those decisions."1 Accordingly,
board independence or outside board members' stock ownership appear
to be excellent candidates for a single characteristic that could best serve
as a proxy for overall good governance.
Evaluating the quality of a firm's governance from a single board
characteristic rather than a multi-factor index might be justified on
econometric grounds as well. The measurement error in computing a
single variable such as a board's stock ownership, for instance, might well
be lower than that of an index, which requires accurate identification of a
multitude of board processes, executive compensation practices, and firm
charter and bylaw provisions. The more numerous the attributes of gov-
ernance that must be tracked to identify the quality of a firm's govern-
ance, the greater the possibility of error in recording the value of any one
component, and hence in measuring overall quality. And the greater the
imprecision in the calculation of the proxy for firms' governance quality,
the higher the probability that the statistical analysis of the relation be-
tween governance and performance will be misspecified.
There are certainly analytical problems presented by single govern-
ance variables. For example, the independence of the board is conven-
tionally identified by the proportion of directors who are neither em-
ployed by nor affiliated (i.e., have material relations) with a firm, but
there are data indicating that not all such independent directors are
111. For economic models in which outside directors have incentives to build
reputations as expert monitors, see Eugene Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the
Firm, 88 J. Pol. Econ. 288, 293-94 (1980); Eugene Fama & Michael Jensen, Separation of
Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & Econ. 301, 315 (1983). The legal literature has long
held a monitoring view of independent directors. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 11, at
164-67. For an economic model that suggests that equity compensation for outside
directors will increase board monitoring, see Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S.
Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and Their Monitoring of the CEO,
88 Am. Econ. Rev. 96, 111 (1998). The legal literature has also advocated directors' stock
ownership to improve monitoring incentives. See, e.g., Charles M. Elson, The Duty of
Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 649, 651-54 (1995)
(arguing that director stock ownership can help combat problem of CEO
overcompensation).
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equal with respect to monitoring effectiveness. 1 2 Using board indepen-
dence alone as a proxy for governance may therefore result in misspecifi-
cation of statistical analyses. However, in our judgment, the identifica-
tion and measurement problems are even more problematic with respect
to indices.
For instance, construction of an index requires that all of the vari-
ables in the index be weighted. The weights a particular index assigns to
individual board characteristics and other governance features are criti-
cal. If the weights are not consistent with the weights used by market
participants in assessing the relation between governance and firm per-
formance, then incorrect inferences will be drawn regarding the relation
between governance and firm performance, even if the governance com-
ponents in the index are correctly measured.
Another problem with a weighting system for an index of govern-
ance quality is that good governance features may well be substitutes and
the interactions among them may also be complex and subtle. Given
these possibilities, it is incorrect to treat them simply as complements,
which is the effect of assigning positive weights to all of the good govern-
ance attributes of an index (the approach of the academic indices). Such
an index ranking will provide an inaccurate measure of the relative qual-
ity of firms' governance. 113 Although hardly any modeling of corporate
112. See, e.g., Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, Are Busy Boards Effective Monitors?,
61 J. Fin. 689, 691-92 (2006) (finding evidence that even an outsider-dominated board is
generally an ineffective monitor when a majority of the independent directors on the
board hold three or more directorships). There are also a number of studies finding that,
with respect to audit committee composition, it is not director independence but rather
the presence of independent directors with appropriate financial accounting expertise that
improves firm value. See, e.g., Mark L. DeFond et al., Does the Market Value Financial
Expertise on Audit Committees of Boards of Directors?, 43 J. Acct. Res. 153, 179 (2005)
(finding that "the market reacts positively to the appointment of [financial experts] to [a
firm's] audit committee, but only when the director has accounting-related expertise and
only when the appointing firm has relatively strong corporate governance"); Roman L.
Weil et al., Audit Committee Financial Literacy: A Work in Progress 17 (Mar. 11, 2005)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://
faculty.chicagogsb.edu/finance/papers/CoatesMaraisWeil-1lMarRevised.pdf (concluding
that "shareholders appear to benefit from" companies having "financial [ly] literate" audit
committee members); cf. Andrew J. Felo et al., Audit Committee Characteristics and the
Perceived Quality of Financial Reporting: An Empirical Analysis 30 (Apr. 2003)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=401240 (finding that "financial/accounting
expertise of the audit committee ... is significantly positively related to financial reporting
quality"). Similarly, computation questions can arise for another governance variable that
is often investigated singly: equity ownership of management. Whether the relevant
ownership for incentive purposes is the percentage of outstanding shares or the dollar
value of the shares held by the manager depends on how the manager's actions that
outsiders cannot monitor are expected to affect firm value. See John E. Core et al.,
Executive Equity Compensation and Incentives: A Survey, 9 Econ. Pol'y Rev. 27, 31 (2003).
113. In addition, if the multiple dimensions of governance the indices seek to capture
cannot be combined into a single dimension, then regardless of measurement issues an
index will not fare better than a single governance device in predicting performance
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governance has been undertaken, and there is therefore no satisfactory
theory of when or whether different aspects of good governance should
be understood to be substitutes or complements, 1 4 empirical research
indicates that the concern is not hypothetical: In fact, at least several
such mechanisms are substitutes. This finding severely complicates an
assessment of good governance practices using a simply constructed
index.
In particular, in an important contribution, Stuart Gillan, Jay
Hartzell, and Laura Starks (GHS) conducted an exhaustive analysis and
found that measures of high-quality governance are, in fact, substi-
tutes."t 5 More specifically, characteristics related to board indepen-
dence, which GHS collectively termed "internal governance," were in-
versely correlated with the G-Index, which-like Cremers and Nair-
GHS characterized as a measure of "external governance."" t 6 In other
words, firms with a more independent board had more defenses (higher
G-Index scores). Although GHS did not examine the relation between
governance and performance, their research bears importantly on how to
interpret GIM's finding, for GHS's research calls into question the use of
governance indices composed of equally weighted sums of items consid-
ered good governance practices, such as the G and E indices and Gov-
Score. 17
because the index is, of course, a one-dimensional construct. David Larcker, Scott
Richardson, and Irem Tuna analyzed the relation between governance and accounting
performance by a principal components analysis that collapses thirty-nine governance
devices into fourteen dimensions. See David F. Larcker et al., Corporate Governance,
Accounting Outcomes, and Organizational Performance, 82 Acct. Rev. 963, 963 (2007).
The large number of factors that remained in their analysis suggest that it may not be
possible to construct a one-dimensional governance index that has predictive power.
However, most of the fourteen factors were not significantly related to the accounting
measures they examined, a finding that may suggest that the desire for parsimony and ease
of comparability across firms-which underlies the effort to create governance indices that
collapse multiple dimensions into one-may not be entirely off the mark.
114. For example, comprehensive reviews of certain key governance mechanisms-
boards of directors and outside blockholders-emphasize that the theoretical modeling of
these devices is extremely limited. See Hermalin & Weisbach, Survey, supra note 110, at 7;
Clifford G. Holderness, A Survey of Blockholders and Corporate Control, 9 Econ. Pol'y
Rev. 51, 52 (2003).
115. Stuart L. Gillan et al., Tradeoffs in Corporate Governance: Evidence from Board
Structures and Charter Provisions 25-26 (Apr. 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/
starks paper.pdf.
116. Id. at 1, 12. The G and E indices do not include internal governance measures,
so their methods of adding up index components are not directly challenged by GHS's
finding; Brown and Caylor's Gov-Score and the commercial indices are directly challenged
because they include both types of governance mechanisms.
117. Examples of other papers also finding that different attributes of good
governance are substitutes include Morris G. Danielson & Jonathan M. Karpoff, On the
Uses of Corporate Governance Provisions, 4J. Corp. Fin. 347, 365-67 (1998) (finding that
firms with poison pills have low inside ownership, high institutional ownership, and high
proportion of outside directors); David Mayers et al., Board Composition and Corporate
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The GHS study was extensive, collecting corporate governance fea-
tures of over 2,000 firms from 1997-2000 in order to investigate the rela-
tion between board attributes and charter provisions relating to takeover
defenses, which comprise the G and E indices.' 18 Their aim was to ascer-
tain whether a strong independent board is a substitute or complement
for the external governance of the market for corporate control. If firms
with independent boards adopt few defenses (have low G-Index values),
then internal and external governance mechanisms are functioning as
complements, whereas if firms with such boards adopt many defenses
(have high G-Index values), then the mechanisms are substitutes.
GHS employed two statistical techniques to identify the clustering of
different attributes of boards that relate to their independence-such as
composition, size, committee characteristics, and separation of the posi-
tions of CEO and board chair-in relation to defenses, along with
univariate comparisons of board features with defenses.1 19 No matter
which methodology was applied, they found that the strength of the inde-
pendence of the board is positively correlated with the number of de-
fenses (high G-Index values); that is, internal and external governance
mechanisms are substitutes. 2 0 Hence, in what would appear to be per-
verse to many corporate governance activists, a conventional metric of
good corporate governance-independent boards-is associated with a
conventional measure of poor corporate governance-entrenched man-
agement, as indicated by the extent of the firm's takeover defenses. Such
associations strongly suggest that evaluating firms according to how they
do with respect to the reigning governance indices, which do not take
into account the complexity of the relation of the components or govern-
Control: Evidence from the Insurance Industry, 70 J. Bus. 33, 56-57 (1997) (concluding
that mutuals employ more outside directors than stock insurance companies, a finding
that is consistent with independent boards being substitutes for the market for corporate
control); Mehran, supra note 38, at 179 (finding that blockholding substitutes for use of
executive incentive compensation). We discuss exclusively GHS in the text not only
because their study is the most recent but also because it is the most comprehensive, has
the largest data set, and is the most closely related to our concerns. GHS examined the
interaction of the G-Index with governance variables not included in it, while undertaking
extensive statistical analyses, including a simultaneous equations estimation that addresses
the methodological concerns with the index literature related to the endogeneity of
governance choices that we discuss infra Part II.B. Larcker, Richardson, and Tuma found
that underlying governance components do not always load with the same sign on fourteen
governance factors that they identify from thirty-nine governance devices, see Larcker et
al., supra note 113, at 986 tbl.5, a finding providing additional support for the contention
that governance mechanisms are sometimes substitutes rather than complements.
118. See Gillan et al., supra note 115, at 2-3.
119. The two techniques used to identify commonalities across firms' governance
characteristics are a cluster analysis that groups firms by their board and charter choices
(so that within each of four groups of sample firms the homogeneity of governance is
maximized while across the groups heterogeneity is maximized), and a principal
components analysis that groups board governance attributes into summary structure
measures, whose relation to the G-Index across firms is then explored. Id. at 13, 19-20.
120. Id. at 12, 18.
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ance elements that the index may be missing, is problematic and likely to
produce an inaccurate understanding of the operation of corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms.
In addition to finding that high-quality governance on one dimen-
sion may offset a need for what are conventionally thought to be best
practices on another governance dimension, GHS found that governance
varies with specific characteristics of firms. Namely, the correlated sets of
governance features between board independence and takeover defenses
are also correlated with other characteristics of firms (such as firm age,
institutional ownership, R&D expenditures, tangible assets, and capital
expenditures). 121 The combination of these two findings underscores
the fact that firms choose their governance characteristics. If particular
governance mechanisms or combinations thereof are best suited for spe-
cific operating environments, then we should expect to find systematic
variation in governance choices across firms. Moreover, if firms optimize
across governance choices, then in the cross-section comparison of firms
with different governance combinations, we should not find systematic
performance differences-i.e., firms with higher good governance index
scores should not outperform those with lower rankings.
Firms' ability to select their governance regimes presents a thorny
technical issue of endogeneity for traditional statistical analyses, and vir-
tually all studies of governance-including those by GIM, BCF, and
Brown and Caylor-have that limitation. This could explain, for in-
stance, why research focused on single governance mechanisms does not
identify a relation between governance and performance. 122 It may also
explain why GIM's findings were not robust. Accordingly, Part II.C elabo-
rates more fully the endogeneity problem and introduces the
econometric technique used to address it. We then report the results of a
study by two of us applying a statistical technique that takes endogeneity
into account in evaluating the relation between governance indices and
performance. Given the theoretical and empirical issues arising from the
use of indices compared to a single governance mechanism that we have
discussed, we think it is an open question whether an index will be of
greater value to investors for evaluating governance quality, and more
importantly, performance, than a single governance dimension capturing
the quality of the board. Accordingly, in our analysis of the relation be-
tween governance and performance that follows, we compare the per-
formance of indices to that of several board characteristics that might
serve as a single-dimension proxy for overall governance quality.
121. Id. at 24.
122. As GHS note, most studies of corporate governance investigate a single
governance mechanism and do not examine the interaction of different devices. Id. at 4.
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C. Econometric Issues: Performance and Governance Are Endogenous
A core and knotty econometric problem in the literature examining
the relation between governance quality and performance is that govern-
ance and performance are not independent. The presence of some gov-
ernance features may be motivated by incentive-based economic models
of managerial behavior, models that also affect performance. Broadly
speaking, these models fall into two categories: agency (also referred to
as moral hazard) and adverse selection models.
In agency models, a divergence in the interests of managers and
shareholders causes managers to take actions that are costly to sharehold-
ers. Such actions are most often characterized as the consumption of
perquisites on the job (such as lavish office equipment), but also refer to
other means by which managers may exercise discretion to benefit them-
selves at the shareholders' expense, such as shirking (lack of effort) or
selecting inferior projects from among those available (i.e., projects with
too little risk). Contracts cannot preclude this activity if shareholders are
unable to observe managerial behavior directly, but governance devices
like managerial ownership can be used to induce managers to act in a
manner that is consistent with the shareholders' interest.123
Adverse selection models are founded on the hypothesis that manag-
ers possess differing levels of ability, which cannot be observed by
shareholders. In this setting, ownership may be used to induce revelation
of the manager's private information, which the shareholders cannot
observe directly, such as information about cash flow or the manager's
ability to generate cash flow. Performance provides information
to the principal about the ability of the manager and is therefore re-
flected in managerial payoffs, including through dismissal for poor
performance. 124
In both settings, a manager has information that shareholders do not
possess, although shareholders are aware of their informational disadvan-
tage. The contracting problem, accordingly, is to write a contract that
mitigates the information asymmetry. In either of the two scenarios,
some features of corporate governance may be interpreted as characteris-
tics of the asymmetry-mitigating contract governing shareholder-manager
relations. Governance is affected by the same unobservable features of
managerial behavior or ability that are linked to ownership and perform-
ance; it is in this sense that governance and performance are endoge-
nous. Analyzing the relation between governance and performance re-
quires different statistical techniques if the two variables are
endogenously related rather than if they are exogenously related (that is,
123. For a classic discussion of the agency problem, see generally SanfordJ. Grossman
& Oliver D. Hart, An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem, 51 Econometrica 7 (1983)
[hereinafter Grossman & Hart, Principal-Agent Problem].
124. For a classic treatment of the adverse selection problem, see generally Roger B.
Myerson, Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem, 47 Econometrica 61
(1979).
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if the relation is bidirectional rather than one-way, with governance af-
fecting performance). An exogenous relationship is, however, universally
assumed in the literature on governance indices.
In order to lay out the alternative methodology, we need to better
specify the potential two-way relationships between different governance
attributes, firm characteristics, and performance. At least since Adolph
Berle and Gardiner Means' classic 1932 work identifying the potential
agency problem in U.S. public corporations, 125 economists have empha-
sized the costs of diffused share ownership-that is, the impact of owner-
ship structure on performance. But as Harold Demsetz argues, because
we observe many successful public companies with diffused share owner-
ship, there must be offsetting benefits-such as better risk-bearing-ren-
dering it difficult to assert that concentrated ownership should be posi-
tively associated with performance. 126 Moreover, performance could
determine ownership for reasons related to performance-based compen-
sation and insider information. For example, superior firm performance
leads to an increase in the value of stock options owned by management,
which, if exercised, would increase their share ownership. Further, if
there are serious divergences between insider and market expectations of
future firm performance, then insiders have an incentive to adjust their
ownership in relation to the expected future performance. Finally,
Charles Himmelberg, Glenn Hubbard, and Darius Palia contend that
ownership structure may be endogenously determined by the firm's con-
tracting environment, which differs across firms in observable and unob-
servable ways. 127 For example, if the scope for perquisite consumption is
low in a firm, then a low level of management ownership may be the
optimal incentive contract.
In addition to ownership, leverage (debt in the capital structure) is a
firm characteristic-related to governance in the form of monitoring by
creditors 128-that may be endogenously determined with performance.
125. Adolph A. Berle & Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private
Property (1932).
126. See Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and the Theory of the Firm,
26 J.L. & Econ. 375, 387-89 (1983). Investors' preference for liquidity would lead to
smaller blockholdings given that larger blocks are less liquid in the secondary market. In
addition, the public policy bias in the United States toward protecting minority-
shareholder rights increases the costs of holding large blocks. Mark J. Roe, Strong
Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance 3-8 (1994);
Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520, 530-36 (1990).
127. Charles P. Himmelberg et al., Understanding the Determinants of Managerial
Ownership and the Link Between Ownership and Performance, 53J. Fin. Econ. 353, 381
(1999). The endogeneity of management ownership has also been noted by many others.
See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Jerold B. Warner, The Distribution of Power Among
Corporate Managers, Shareholders, and Directors, 20J. Fin. Econ. 3, 4 (1988) (noting "the
interrelations between ownership, firm characteristics, and corporate performance").
128. Michael Jensen provides another explanation of how debt reduces agency
problems: By binding managers to pay out cash to creditors, debt reduces free cash flow-
cash in excess of the positive net present value projects available to the firm-that
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In a seminal paper, Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart considered the ex
ante efficiency perspective to derive predictions about a firm's financing
decisions in an agency setting.' 29 An initial entrepreneur seeks to maxi-
mize firm value by employing a disciplinary mechanism that forces him to
choose the value-maximizing level of debt. Extending that idea, Sanjai
Bhagat, Brian Bolton, and Ajay Subramanian show that the optimal
choice of debt from the viewpoint of shareholders differs from the opti-
mal choice of debt from the managers' perspective. 30
The conflict of interest between managers and shareholders over fi-
nancing policy arises for three reasons. First, shareholders are much bet-
ter diversified than managers who, besides having stock and stock options
in the firm, have their human capital tied to the firm.1 3 1 Second, as sug-
gested by Michael Jensen, a larger level of debt precommits the manager
to working harder to generate and pay off the firm's cash flows to outside
investors.1 32 Third, commentators have hypothesized that managers may
increase leverage beyond what might be implied by some "optimal capital
structure" in order to increase the voting power of their equity stakes and
thereby reduce the likelihood of a takeover and the resulting possible loss
of employment. 133
While the above research focuses on capital structure and manage-
rial entrenchment, a different strand of the literature has focused on the
relation between ownership and capital structure. Two separate works,
one by Sanford Grossman and Oliver Hart and the other by Oliver Hart
and John Moore, consider an incomplete contracting environment-one
in which it is difficult to specify all possible future states of nature and
relevant decisions in a contract that can be enforced in a court.134 In
such an incomplete contracting environment, the allocation of control
rights to management through stock ownership, rather than the provi-
sion of contractual payments under compensation agreements, can be
used to provide incentives to the managers to make necessary investments
(such as investing in firm-specific human capital) that maximize the value
of the firm.
managers could otherwise waste on negative net present value projects rather than return
to shareholders. See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate
Finance, and Takeovers, 76 Am. Econ. Rev. 323, 323-24 (1986).
129. See Grossman & Hart, Principal-Agent Problem, supra note 123, at 7.
130. See Sanjai Bhagat et al., Manager Characteristics and Capital Structure 10 (July
17, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review).
131. Fama, supra note 111, at 291-92.
132. See Jensen, supra note 128, at 324.
133. Milton Harris & Artur Raviv, Corporate Control Contests and Capital Structure,
20 J. Fin. Econ. 55, 56-59 (1988); Ren6 M. Stulz, Managerial Control of Voting Rights:
Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 25, 25-28
(1988).
134. Sanford Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A
Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94J. Pol. Econ. 691 (1986); Oliver D. Hart &
John Moore, Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm, 98 J. Pol. Econ. 1119 (1990).
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This brief overview of the interrelationships among corporate gov-
ernance-including capital and ownership structure, and corporate per-
formance-suggests, from an econometric viewpoint, that to study the
relationship between corporate governance and performance, one would
need to formulate a system of simultaneous equations that specifies the
relationships among the above-mentioned variables. In recent work, two
of us have specified and estimated the following system of four simultane-
ous equations, which captures the interrelationships among the afore-
mentioned variables: 13 5
Performance = fJ(Ownership, Governance, Capital Structure, Z1, E1 ) (la)
Governance = f 2 (Performance, Ownership, Capital Structure, Z2 , E2) (1b)Ownership = Jr(Governance, Performance, Capital Structure, Z3, r,)(lc)
Capital Structure = fi(Governance, Performance, Ownership, Z 4, 4) (Id)
The Zi are vectors of control variables and instruments influencing
the dependent variables and the E, are the error terms associated with
exogenous noise and the unobservable features of managerial behavior
or ability that explain cross-sectional variation in performance, owner-
ship, capital structure, and governance.' 36
Most of the extant literature that we have discussed, such as GIM's
and BCF's studies, has analyzed the relation between governance and per-
formance considering only the first equation in the above system. This
limited examination is equivalent to estimating the above system using
ordinary least squares (OLS), instead of two-stage least squares (2SLS) or
three-stage least squares (3SLS), which are econometrically more appro-
priate for estimating a system of simultaneous equations.' 3 7 What hap-
135. See Bhagat & Bolton, supra note 40, at 260.
136. Id.
137. OLS is a regression method that estimates a linear combination of the
explanatory or independent variables so as to minimize the sum of squared residuals or
errors (which are the difference between the actual and estimated values of the dependent
variable). Peter Kennedy, A Guide to Econometrics 13 (5th ed. 2003). This estimator,
which is the most widely used econometric technique, has desirable statistical properties if
certain assumptions hold. Id. at 13-14. The most important assumption for this Article's
analysis is that the explanatory variables are exogenous, that is, that they are distributed
independently of the error term and hence stand in a fixed relation to the dependent
variable. That assumption is violated when an independent variable is determined
simultaneously with the dependent variable, as is the case, we maintain, regarding
governance and performance. Moreover, as discussed in the next section, Bhagat and
Bolton empirically tested the nature of the relation between the two variables and found
that OLS is biased due to endogeneity. See Bhagat & Bolton, supra note 40, at 264-66.
Both the 2SLS and 3SLS estimation techniques address the violation of the exogeneity
assumption and therefore retain desirable statistical properties as estimators; 2SLS does
this by considering each equation at a time, while 3SLS considers the entire system of
equations, allowing for cross-correlation of the error terms in all of the equations.
Kennedy, supra, at 181, 188-91. In theory, 3SLS is "better" econometrically than 2SLS
(the estimators are more efficient, a desirable statistical property), but in practice the
results are usually similar, as was true in Bhagat and Bolton's empirical analysis. See infra
Appendix B.
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pens if one estimates a system of simultaneous equations using OLS? Let
us assume, for the sake of exposition, that there is no relationship be-
tween (a specific measure of) governance and (a specific measure of)
performance. Under such an assumption, it is possible for the OLS esti-
mates of the relationship between governance and performance to be
statistically insignificant, significantly positive, or significantly negative.
On the other hand, if the truth is that there is, say, a positive relationship
between governance and performance, it is also possible for the OLS esti-
mates of the relationship between governance and performance to be
statistically insignificant, significantly positive, or significantly negative. 138
In other words, OLS estimates of the above system of equations cannot
allow us to make any econometrically defensible inferences about the re-
lationship between governance and performance. 13 9
In the next subpart we illustrate that this general econometric wis-
dom is correct in the context of estimating the relation between govern-
ance and performance: Findings regarding the relationship between va-
rious governance measures and performance identified in the literature
using OLS are not always robust when those relationships are estimated
in a system of simultaneous equations. However, it should be noted that
estimating a simultaneous equation system in order to handle en-
dogeneity is not without its own technical issues. To estimate a system of
simultaneous equations, the researcher must identify exogenous instru-
138. This is a fundamental econometrics point; for example, Kennedy notes, "In a
system of simultaneous equations, all the endogenous variables are random variables-a
change in any disturbance term changes all the endogenous variables since they are
determined simultaneously .... As a consequence, the OLS estimator is biased, even
asymptotically." Kennedy, supra note 137, at 180. In addition, Maddala observes, "[T]he
simultaneity problem results in inconsistent estimators of the parameters, when the
structural equations are estimated by ordinary least squares." G.S. Maddala, Introduction
to Econometrics 389 (3d ed. 2001).
139. The economics literature has numerous examples of the inappropriateness of
using OLS when the underlying set of relationships suggests a need to estimate a system of
simultaneous equations. A good example is a study by Allyn D. Strickland & Leonard W.
Weiss, Advertising, Concentration, and Price-Cost Margins, 84 J. Pol. Econ. 1109 (1976).
This research attempted to estimate the relation between industry concentration and
advertising expenditures, and thereby to address the concern of regulators and
policyrnakers that companies in more concentrated industries enjoyed higher profit
margins. Following previous researchers, they first estimated the impact of industry
concentration (C) on advertising expenditures (A) and price/cost margin in that industry
(M):
M = h, (C, A, control variables)
When this equation was estimated using OLS, the coefficient on C was significant and
positive, giving credence to the notion that companies in more concentrated industries
enjoyed higher profit margins. However, the authors correctly pointed out that the above
equation was but one equation in a system of simultaneous equations. The other two
equations in the system are
A = h 2 (C, M, control variables)
C = h3 (A, control variables)
When the above three equations were estimated as a system of equations, there was no
significant relation between concentration and profit margin.
1842 [Vol. 108:1803
HeinOnline -- 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1842 2008
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDICES
mental variables that explain one of the endogenous variables but not the
other(s), and with multiple endogenous variables, as in the system of
equations represented by la-ld, an instrumental variable is needed for
each of the endogenous variables in an equation. 140 Identification of
such instruments can be exceedingly difficult because, when two vari-
ables' values are integrally connected, it is likely that most explanatory
variables affecting one will also directly affect the other. Thus researchers
might opt for OLS rather than the more appropriate simultaneous equa-
tion technique on the rationale that the latter system cannot be properly
estimated either.
1. Comparing the Relative Performance of Governance Indices and Single
Attributes of Governance in Predicting Future Performance. - Bhagat and
Bolton undertook a comprehensive, comparative analysis of the relation-
ship between governance indices, single attributes of governance, and
performance using a sample of the largest 1,500 U.S. corporations over
the period 1998-2002 and the simultaneous equation setup described
supra in equations la-ld.1 4 ' Tables 1 and 2 summarize their results re-
garding the relationship between governance and performance. While
previous studies have used both stock-market- and accounting-based mea-
sures of performance, Bhagat and Bolton emphasized accounting mea-
sures rather than stock returns as the appropriate performance measure
for this analysis: If investors anticipate the effect of corporate governance
on performance, then long-term stock returns will not be significantly
correlated with governance even if a significant correlation between per-
formance and governance indeed exists. 142 Accounting measures, by
contrast, do not suffer from such an anticipation problem.
140. E.g., Kennedy, supra note 137, at 188. Technically, an instrument is an
explanatory variable that is uncorrelated with the residual or error term of the regression
but is correlated with the endogenous variable for which it is an instrument. Id. at 159.
2SLS is the instrumental variables (IV) approach to a single equation, and 3SLS is the IV
approach to a system of equations. In IV regression models, the estimation proceeds in
stages: A first stage is estimated using the instruments to obtain predicted values for the
potentially endogenous variables; in the second stage, the predicted values are regressed
on the dependent variable in question. Id. at 189-91.
141. Bhagat & Bolton, supra note 40. The instruments used to estimate the system of
equations (la-ld) are: in equation (la), the ratio of treasury stock to assets; (lb), the
percentage of directors who are active CEOs and the percentage of firm stock owned by
directors; (1c), the ratio of CEO tenure to CEO age, which is interpreted as a measure of
CEO quality; and (1d), the modified Altman's Z-score, which is considered to be a proxy
for financial distress. Id. at 262-63. The choice of instruments and the appropriateness of
using instrumental variables rather than OLS are discussed in Appendix B.
142. For a detailed discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of using stock-
market- and accounting-based measures of performance, see Sanjai Bhagat & Richard H.
Jefferis, Jr., The Econometrics of Corporate Governance Studies 17-20 (2002).
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TABLE 1: PERFORMANcE-GOVERNANCE RELATIONSHIP: PERFORMANCE
MEASURED BY RETURN ON ASSETS
This table presents the coefficients on the governance variable
from equation (la) estimated from the following system (p-values are
in parentheses):
(la) Performance = fi (Ownership, Governance, Leverage,
Log(Assets), Industry Performance, (R&D and Advertising
Expenses) / Assets, Board Size, Stock Volatility, Treasury
Stock / Assets, Ej)
(1b) Governance = f2 (Performance, Ownership, Leverage,
(R&D and Advertising Expenses) / Assets, Board Size,
Stock Volatility, Median Director Ownership Percentage,
Percentage Independent Directors, E2)
(1c) Ownership = f3 (Performance, Governance, Log(Assets),
Leverage, (R&D and Advertising Expenses) / Assets,
Board Size, Stock Volatility, CEO Tenure / CEO Age, E3)
(1d) Leverage = fi (Performance, Governance, Ownership,
Industry Leverage, Log(Assets), (R&D and Advertising
Expenses) / Assets, Board Size, Stock Volatility, Altman's
Z-Score, E4)
Operating performance (ROA) is considered for three time pe-
riods: contemporaneous (ROAr), next year (ROAr±1), and next two
years (ROAt+I to t+2). The following governance variables are consid-
ered: the Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick G-Index; the Bebchuk,
Cohen, and Ferrell E-Index; the Glass Lewis Board Accountability
Index; The Corporate Library (TCL) Benchmark score; the Brown
and Caylor Gov-Score and Gov-7 (data are available only for 2002);
the dollar value of the median director's stock holdings; a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also the Chair of the board, 0 other-
wise; and the percent of directors who are independent. The sample
consists of about 1,500 of the largest U.S. corporations for the period
1998-2002; in some cases data constraints allow for consideration of
only a shorter period.
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Glass Lewis -0.014 -0.017 -0.011
(0.01) (0.00) (0.06)
TCL Benchmark Score -0.005 -0.003 -0.002
(0.05) (0.27) (0.21)
Brown & Caylor Gov-Score -0.004 -0.005
(0.60) (0.61)
Brown & Caylor Gov-7 -0.001 -0.001 -
(0.44) (0.53)
$ Value of Median Director's Holdings 0.006 0.005 0.002
(0.01) (0.04) (0.16)
CEO-Chair Duality (=1 if Dual) -0.029 -0.029 -0.017
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
% of Directors Independent -0.131 -0.001 -0.068
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
Neither table includes Tobin's Q as a performance measure even
though prior studies, notably those by GIM and BCF, have treated it as a
key performance measure.' 43 This omission is justified because Tobin's
Q has two serious shortcomings, even if it does not suffer from the antici-
pation problem of stock returns. First, if a firm has a high fraction of its
assets as intangible assets rather than tangible assets and if monitoring
intangible assets is difficult for shareholders, then shareholders will likely
require a higher level of managerial ownership to align incentives prop-
erly. But, because the firm has a high fraction of its assets as intangibles,
it will have a high Tobin's Q: The numerator of the Tobin's Q ratio
(market price) will impound the present value of the cash flows gener-
ated by the intangible assets, while the denominator (book value) usually
does not include investments the firm has made in its intangible assets. 144
As a consequence, these intangible assets will generate a positive correla-
tion between ownership and performance, but this relation is spurious-
due to the calculation of Tobin's Q-not causal.
Second, a higher Tobin's Q might be reflective of a firm's greater
market power (which is an intangible asset that affects the numerator and
not the denominator of the ratio). Shareholders, cognizant of the fact
that this market power shields the management from the discipline of the
143. Bhagat & Bolton, supra note 40, also considered the relationship between
Tobin's Q and the seven governance measures examined in the tables. They did not find
any significant or consistent relationship between any governance measure (including the
G and E indices) and future Tobin's Q. See id. at 264, 266; infra Appendix B.
144. Under current accounting conventions, the denominator will not include the
replacement value of these intangible assets. Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets,
Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 142, 1 10 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd.
2001) (stating that internally developed intangible assets are not recognized as assets in
accounting statements).
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product market, will, in all probability, require managers of such a com-
pany to own more stock. This is because greater managerial ownership
will be expected to align better managers' incentives with shareholder
interests and to offset the effect of the reduced discipline of the product
market. In that scenario, we would again observe a spurious relation be-
tween performance as measured by Tobin's Q and managerial ownership.
Because ownership is inextricably related to governance (as represented
by the system of equations la-ld), the problematic use of Tobin's Q to
analyze the relation between performance and ownership cannot be
avoided by analyzing the relation between performance and governance
features that exclude ownership (e.g., analyses of GIM and BCF).
The results in Table 1 indicate a significant negative correlation be-
tween the G-Index and next year's return on assets (ROA). 14 5 Given that
lower G-Index numbers reflect fewer defenses and thus more exposure to
the external governance mechanism of the market for control, these find-
ings are consistent with a positive relation between good governance, as
measured by GIM, and operating performance. Results using the con-
temporaneous operating performance are similar. However, this relation
is insignificant, although the sign is still negative, when we consider oper-
ating performance over the next two years. These findings are consistent
with GIM's finding of a positive relation between good governance and
performance for the period 1990-1999, and the results extend GIM's
findings to 2000-2004.
However, it is important to note that GIM's finding of a positive rela-
tion between good governance and performance is based on long-term
stock returns as the measure of performance, and their analysis does not
take into account the endogeneity of the relationships among corporate
governance, performance, capital structure, and corporate ownership
structure. 1 4 6 As previously noted, if investors anticipate the effect of cor-
porate governance on performance, long-term stock returns will not be
significantly correlated with governance even if a significant correlation
between performance and governance exists. Indeed, as documented by
Bhagat and Bolton (and summarized in Table 2), there is no significant
or consistent relation between GIM's measure or any other measure of
145. The accounting measure of performance in Table 1 is ROA because a
comprehensive study comparing accounting performance measures provides evidence
supporting its use. See Brad M. Barber & John D. Lyon, Detecting Abnormal Operating
Performance: The Empirical Power and Specification of Test Statistics, 41 J. Fin. Econ.
359, 387-93 (1996).
146. Consistent with the findings reported here, CGR also found a positive relation
between the G-Index and next year's ROA, although they also did not take into account
the endogeneity of the relationships among corporate governance, performance, capital
structure, and corporate ownership structure. See Core et al., Weak Governance, supra
note 91, at 668-69.
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governance and contemporaneous, next year's, or next two years' stock
returns. 147
TABLE 2: PERFORMANCE-GoVERNANCE RELATIONSHIP: PERFORMANCE
MEASURED BY STOCK RETURN
This table presents the coefficients on the governance variable
from equation (la) estimated from the following system (p-values are
in parentheses):
(la) Performance = fi (Ownership, Governance, Leverage,
Log(Assets), Industry Performance, (R&D and Advertising
Expenses) / Assets, Board Size, Stock Volatility, Treasury
Stock / Assets, Ej)
(1b) Governance = f2 (Performance, Ownership, Leverage,
(R&D and Advertising Expenses) / Assets, Board Size,
Stock Volatility, Median Director Ownership Percentage,
Percentage Independent Directors, E2 )(Ic) Ownership = f3 (Performance, Governance, Log(Assets),
Leverage, (R&D and Advertising Expenses) / Assets,
Board Size, Stock Volatility, CEO Tenure / CEO Age, E3)
(1d) Leverage = fi (Performance, Governance, Ownership,
Industry Leverage, Log(Assets), (R&D and Advertising
Expenses) / Assets, Board Size, Stock Volatility, Altman's
Z-Score, E4)
Stock return (RETURN) is considered for three time periods: con-
temporaneous (RETURNr), next year (RETURN,,,), and next two
years (RETURNt+I t. t+2). The governance variables considered are de-
scribed in Table 1. The sample consists of about 1,500 of the largest
U.S. corporations for the period 1998-2002; in some cases data con-
straints allow for consideration of only a shorter period.
147. These findings are consistent with those of John Core, Robert Holthausen, and
David Larcker, who concluded that their governance measures relating to board structure
(size, director composition, age and tenure, and identity of chair) and ownership structure
(blockholdings) "more consistently predict future accounting operating performance than
future stock market performance." John E. Core et al., Corporate Governance, Chief
Executive Officer Compensation, and Firm Performance, 51 J. Fin. Econ. 371, 403-04
(1999) [hereinafter Core et al., Corporate Governance].
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Governance Variable: Return, Return,,, Return.[ t. t 2
GIM G-Index -0.010 -0.013 -0.007
(0.75) (0.71) (0.64)
BCF E-Index -0.044 -0.021 -0.001
(0.59) (0.81) (0.97)
Glass Lewis -0.007 -0.007 -0.033
(0.87) (0.85) (0.32)
TCL Benchmark Score -0.018 0.000 0.003
(0.12) (0.97) (0.64)
Brown & Caylor Gov-Score 0.011 -0.049 -
(0.73) (0.41)
Brown & Caylor Gov-7 0.018 0.001 -
(0.69) (0.76)
$ Value of Median Director's Holdings 0.012 0.008 0.003
(0.44) (0.64) (0.72)
CEO-Chair Duality (=1 if Dual) -0.024 -0.064 -0.025
(0.70) (0.29) (0.30)
% of Directors Independent 0.157 -0.250 -0.092
(0.53) (0.33) (0.40)
Table 1 also indicates that there is a significant negative correlation
between the E-Index and next year's ROA. As with the G-Index, lower E-
Index numbers reflect better governance; hence, these results are consis-
tent with a positive relation between operating performance and good
governance (as measured by BCF). Results using the contemporaneous
and next two years' operating performance are similar. But, again, paral-
leling GIM's analysis, BCF's finding of a positive relation between good
governance and performance is based on long-term stock returns, and
Table 2 indicates that there is no significant relation between BCF's mea-
sure of governance and contemporaneous, next year's, or the next two
years' stock returns.
Single governance variables related to the board of directors also ex-
hibit significant relationships with accounting performance. There is a
significant and positive relation between the dollar value of the median
director's stock ownership and contemporaneous, next year's, and next
two years' operating performance. Table 3 and Figure 1 provide addi-
tional characterizations of the univariate relationship between board
ownership and future operating performance.
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TABLE 3: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOLLAR BOARD OWNERSHIP AND
RETURN ON ASSETS FOR THE SUBSEQUENT Two YEARS
The sample consists of about 1,500 of the largest U.S. corpora-
tions for 2002.
Mean Dollar Value of Industry-Adjusted Return on
Median Director's Assets for the Subsequent
Ownership Quartile Ownership Two Years
Lowest Ownership Quartile $94,366 -0.4%
Second $462,758 -0.1%
Third $1,267,629 0.2%
Highest Ownership Quartile $7,185,716 0.3%
FIGURE 1: RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOLLAR BOARD OWNERSHIP BY











Q1- Low Q2 Q3 Q4- High
Director Dollar Ownership Quartiles
Similarly, the separation of the positions of CEO and board chair
(referred to in the literature as CEO-Chair duality) is negatively and sig-
nificantly related to contemporaneous, next year's, and next two years'
operating performance. 148 This finding, along with the results for the G
148. Having an independent (i.e., non-CEO) chair is frequently included as one of
the components indicating the strength of a board's independence. See, e.g., infra
Appendix A (indicating that Brown and Caylor's Gov-Score includes CEO-Chair duality as
positive governance factor). The governance variable CEO-Chair duality equals 1 if the
CEO is Chair and 0 otherwise. Hence, a negative relation between CEO-Chair duality and
performance is equivalent to a positive relation between separation of the positions of CEO
and Chair and performance.
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and E indices, suggests that greater managerial control may lead to worse
future operating performance. It is also in sharp contrast to the previous
literature that has generally found no significant relation between CEO-
Chair duality and future performance.1 49 Board independence, however,
is negatively and significantly related to contemporaneous, next year's,
and next two years' operating performance. This result is surprising, es-
pecially considering the recent emphasis that has been placed on board
independence by the stock exchanges' amended listing requirements
post-Enron; 1 50 however, it is consistent with prior literature on boards. 1 51
Table 1 also contains some probative evidence on commercial indi-
ces. The TCL compliance rating is unrelated to next year's and next two
years' operating performance, and its relation with contemporaneous op-
erating performance is negative but only marginally significant. 152 Fur-
thermore, Brown and Caylor's Gov-Score (which uses the components of
ISS's assessment of acceptable governance practices) is unrelated to con-
temporaneous and next year's operating performance. These findings
highlight the problems of constructing a governance index using multi-
ple indicators of board structure and processes, charter provisions, and
management compensation structure. As noted earlier, while these fea-
tures do characterize a company's governance, construction of a govern-
ance index requires the daunting task of properly weighting the various
components.' 5 3 The failure to find a relation between these multiple-
dimension indices and performance may well be a function of inapposite,
149. See, e.g., Ram Baliga et al., CEO Duality and Firm Performance: What's the
Fuss?, 17 Strategic Mgmt. J. 41, 45-51 (1996) (finding no significant relation between
CEO-Chair duality and future performance) ;James A. Brickley et al., Leadership Structure:
Separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board, 3J. Corp. Fin. 189, 192 (1997) (same);
Maria Carapeto et al., Does Duality Destroy Value? 4 (Jan. 12, 2005) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=686707 (confirming same results for U.K. data). One
possible explanation for the disparity may be that these earlier studies did not control for
the endogeneity of performance and governance. In addition, the sample sizes in those
studies are much smaller than in Bhagat and Bolton. Compare Bhagat & Bolton, supra
note 40, at 261 (using sample sizes ranging from approximately 6,000 to 24,000), with
Baliga et al., supra, at 44-45 (using sample sizes ranging from approximately 10 to 375),
and Brickley et al., supra, at 197-98 (using sample size of 661), and Carapeto et al., supra,
at 5 (using sample size of 250).
150. The NYSE and NASDAQ required independent nominating and compensation
committees and majority board independence after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
151. The literature suggests that there may be a negative relation between
performance and the proportion of a board that is independent. See Hermalin &
Weisbach, Survey, supra note 110, at 18 (reviewing the literature). For reviews of the
literature on the relation more generally between performance and board independence,
see supra note 24.
152. Bhagat and Bolton analyzed TCL's benchmark compliance rating rather than its
effectiveness governance rating in their study. TCL's compliance rating is more
comparable to the other indices Bhagat and Bolton study, though TCL did not consider it
to be an appropriate measure of governance quality. See infra Appendix A.
153. See supra Part II.B.
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weights on the components, rather than the true absence of a relation
between performance and governance. Even when a smaller set of ISS
variables is used-as is the case with Brown and Caylor's Gov-7 index-
there is no consistent and significant relationship between better govern-
ance and better performance. By contrast, when the same analysis was
performed using Glass Lewis's Board Accountability Index, which is re-
lated to BCF's E-Index, 154 not surprisingly the results were qualitatively
very similar to those for the G and E indices: Better governed firms
(lower index values) have higher contemporaneous and subsequent op-
erating performance, but there is no significant relation between the
Board Accountability Index and stock returns.
Finally, Bhagat and Bolton found that the G-Index and median di-
rector ownership were uncorrelated. This finding suggests that a com-
posite measure of governance that combines the information contained
in the G-Index and median director ownership might be a more powerful
predictor of operating performance than either measure by itself. For
each year, all firms are ranked from best governed to worst governed with
respect to each of the two governance variables, and the sum of these two
ranks provides a composite governance score (Composite G-Ownership
index) for each year for each sample firm. Consistent with Bhagat and
Bolton's hypothesis, the combined measure of governance outperforms
either of the two measures taken separately. They found that a 1% im-
provement in governance as measured by the composite index led to a
1.874% change in operating performance in the current period, a
1.567% change in next year's operating performance, and a 1.520%
change in the next two years' operating performance-the respective
changes per 1% governance improvement for the G-Index alone were
0.854%, 0.763%, and 0.287%.
The analysis by Bhagat and Bolton summarized in Tables 1-3 does
not compare the performance of the most prominent commercial index,
that devised by ISS, and other commercial indices, as providers do not
publicly disclose the details of their indices' construction. It does include
TCL's compliance benchmark rating (the index that TCL deemphasized
of its two rankings), Glass Lewis's index (which is a minor tweaking of the
E-Index), Brown and Caylor's Gov-Score (as the closest approximate to
ISS's index, by straightforwardly tallying fifty-one governance compo-
nents out of the over sixty factors that are employed by ISS in a more
complicated, proprietary weighting system), and Brown and Caylor's Gov-
7, which uses only seven of the Gov-Score components.155
But there is no plausible reason to expect that commercial indices
that are not analyzed would perform any better than the indices with a
family resemblance that were investigated. To any reasonable observer,
154. As previously noted, Glass Lewis's Board Accountability Index consists of five of
the six corporate charter provisions that comprise BCF's E-Index. See supra note 65. The
correlation between these two indices is 0.99.
155. See supra notes 65, 68, 69, 84 and accompanying text.
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the burden of proof concerning whether ISS's index would perform bet-
ter than its simplified version, the Gov-Score, ought to be placed on ISS,
because it is in possession of the relevant data. In support of this conten-
tion, ISS describes a process in which it constantly updates the weighting
algorithm,' 56 suggesting that the index might not predict performance
because the firm feels a continual need to tinker with it. Furthermore,
our reported results suggest that the more components in an index, the
less likely it is to be positively associated with performance (in Tables 1-3,
Gov-Score, the index with the highest number of components, fared
worse than those with fewer-including the single board characteristics),
a finding consistent with the fact that governance components may inter-
act as substitutes and not complements. 15 7 With regard to the other com-
mercial indices that were not analyzed, it is implausible that they would
do better than those investigated: TCL's preferred ranking system, along
with GovernanceMetric's index, has very few gradations across firms and
would therefore intuitively appear to be even less capable of predicting
small differences in performance than the analyzed indices, which have
greater variation.
Finally, recent work by Robert Daines, Ian Gow, and David Larcker
investigated whether three commercial indices (ISS, TCL, and
GovernanceMetrics) can predict future performance. 1 58 Their study pro-
vides additional support for our extrapolation of the limitations of aca-
demic indices to commercial products: They find no systematic relation
exists between the indices and performance. 159 Although they do not
employ a simultaneous equation methodology, which is the approach we
would prefer for seeking to identify the relation between governance and
performance, their results suggest that the commercial indices perform
even more poorly than the academic indices.
In summary, the findings in Tables 1-3 suggest that certain complex
measures of corporate governance-the G and E indices-and certain
simple measures-director ownership and CEO-Chair separation-are
positively associated with current and future operating performance.
This further suggests that there is not an obvious benefit to using those
more complex measures. Indeed, governance indices that are comprised
of more dimensions than the G and E indices and are therefore closer in
form to indices marketed by commercial vendors such as TCL and ISS
156. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
157. The same problem would explain the other index that fared equally as poorly as
Gov-Score, TCL's compliance benchmark rating. In contrast to the G-Index, TCL's rating
includes more than one governance dimension. See infra Appendix A for a description.
158. See Daines et al., supra note 9, at 4-5.
159. See id. at 22-27, 32, 56 tbl.8. They use several performance measures, including
ROA, excess stock returns, and Tobin's Q. Only a fourth rating by Audit Integrity, a rating
that focused on accounting practices and financial statement risk and was included for
comparison to the three better-known and broader governance metrics, had some positive
predictive ability: It was significantly positive in some model specifications of the ROA and
stock performance measures. Id. at 22-23, 25-27.
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are not even related to future performance. The combination of only
one of those dimensions, median outside director ownership, with the G-
Index appears to have a greater impact on future operating performance
than any of the governance indices alone.
2. Comparing the Relative Performance of Governance Indices and Single
Attributes of Governance in Predicting Management Turnover After Poor
Performance. - Although the analysis up to now has focused on the rela-
tion between governance and overall performance, it is possible that gov-
ernance matters most, or only, for a firm experiencing a crisis or needing
to make a critical decision, such as the decision to change senior manage-
ment. In this regard, governance may be more important for imposing
discipline and providing fresh leadership when the corporation is per-
forming poorly than in the ordinary course of events.
160
To investigate this possibility, Bhagat and Bolton examined the im-
pact on management turnover following poor performance of the aca-
demic governance indices and single board governance attributes. They
estimated a multinomial logit regression in which the dependent variable
was equal to zero if no turnover occurred in a firm-year, one if the turno-
ver was disciplinary (i.e., the manager appeared to have been dismissed
because of poor performance), and two if the turnover was nondiscipli-
nary (i.e., the dismissal was not based on performance). 16 1 Using the
past two years' stock return as the performance measure, they estimated
the following baseline equation:
Type of CEO Turnover = gi(Past 2 years' stock return, Z1, E1 ) (2a)
160. See, e.g., Hermalin & Weisbach, Survey, supra note 110, at 17.
161. CEO turnover is classified as "nondisciplinary" if the CEO died, if the CEO was
older than sixty-three, if the change was the result of an announced transition plan, or if
the CEO stayed on as chair of the board for more than a year. CEO turnover is classified as
"disciplinary" if the CEO resigned to pursue other interests, if the CEO was terminated, or
if no specific reason was given. Additionally, to address endogeneity concerns involving
management turnover and performance (and ownership), Bhagat and Bolton estimated a
system of five equations: la, lb, Ic, Id, and 2b. Results from taking turnover endogeneity
into account are entirely consistent with the results reported infra notes 162-165 and
accompanying text. These disciplinary/nondisciplinary classification criteria are similar to
those used in past literature. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Farrell & David A. Whidbee, Impact of
Firm Performance Expectations on CEO Turnover and Replacement Decisions, 36J. Acct.
& Econ. 165, 172 (2003) (classifying as "forced" all turnovers "other than those arising
from retirement, normal management succession, death, illness, or those involving the
CEO's departure for a prestigious position elsewhere" and "assum[ing] a voluntary
retirement for any departing CEO at least 64 years old unless . . . information [is
uncovered] suggesting the departure is performance-related"); Stuart C. Gilson,
Management Turnover and Financial Distress, 25 J. Fin. Econ. 241, 251 tbl.5 n.A (1989)
(classifying as "forced" all turnovers "except those due to retirement, death, illness, normal
management succession and other factors unrelated to firms' poor financial performance
or insolvency"); Mark R. Huson et al., Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO
Turnover: A Long-Term Perspective, 56J. Fin. 2265, 2273 (2001) (classifying as "forced"
all turnovers except those resulting from "death, poor health, or the acceptance of another
position" and those where age or other conditions of change plausibly suggest turnover
was voluntary).
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The Zl vector of controls includes CEO ownership, CEO age, CEO
tenure, firm size, industry return, and year dummy variables. 162 The
baseline results indicate that a firm's stock market returns during the pre-
vious two years, CEO stock ownership, and CEO tenure are significantly
and negatively related to disciplinary CEO turnover; these findings are
consistent with the prior literature. 16 3 Bhagat and Bolton further found
that prior two years' returns of firms in the industry are significantly and
positively related to disciplinary CEO turnover. In other words, if prior
industry performance has been good, the probability of disciplinary CEO
turnover increases, regardless of the particular company's performance.
Similarly, if prior industry performance has been poor, the probability of
disciplinary CEO turnover decreases, regardless of the particular com-
pany's performance.
To determine the role that governance plays in CEO turnover,
Bhagat and Bolton created an interactive variable that is the product of
the past two years' stock return and the governance variable. The reason-
ing behind this construct is that if the firm is performing adequately,
good governance should not lead to CEO turnover; only when perform-
ance is poor would we expect to find better governed firms more likely to
replace the CEO. To measure this effect, they estimated the following
modified version of equation 2a:
Type of CEO Turnover = g2 (Past 2 years' stock return, Governance,
Past 2 years' stock return x Governance, Z1, E2) (2b)
As summarized in Tables 4 and 5, Bhagat and Bolton found that
when the governance variables were included, the prior return variable
was not significant in seven of the nine cases, suggesting that poor per-
formance alone is not enough to lead to a change in senior management.
In addition, the governance variable by itself was statistically not signifi-
cant in most cases.' 64 This finding suggests that good governance per se
is not related to disciplinary turnover (or that the literature's definition
of good governance is misplaced, at least with respect to disciplinary
turnover).
162. These control variables are motivated by a substantial literature on performance
and CEO turnover. See, e.g., Ellen Engel et al., CEO Turnover and Properties of
Accounting Information, 36 J. Acct. & Econ. 197, 211-20 (2003) (using CEO age and
industry-adjusted returns); Farrell & Whidbee, supra note 161, at 166-67 (using CEO age,
CEO tenure, firm size, and industry-adjusted performance); Huson et al., supra note 161,
at 2283-92 (using CEO age and year dummies); Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors
and CEO Turnover, 20J. Fin. Econ. 431, 448-59 (1988) (using CEO share ownership).
163. See, e.g., Huson et al., supra note 161, at 2287-88, 2290 (noting that forced
turnover is negatively related to prior two years' stock returns, CEO stock ownership, and
CEO tenure).
164. The exception is that when the CEO is also the chair, he is less likely to
experience disciplinary turnover.
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However, the key variable for determining whether governance is re-
lated to disciplinary turnover for poorly performing firms is the interac-
tive term. When governance is measured by either the percentage of in-
dependent directors or the dollar value of the median outside director's
stock ownership, the interactive term is negative and statistically signifi-
cant. These findings suggest that good governance, as measured by those
single board attributes, increases the probability of disciplinary turnover
for poorly performing firms.' 65 The interactive term is significantly nega-
tive for CEO-Chair duality, which means that when the CEO is also the
chair, he is more likely to experience disciplinary turnover given poor
firm performance. 166
The governance indices do not fare as well as the single governance
measures in predicting good performance when performance is mea-
sured by forced CEO turnover following poor financial performance.
The interaction terms with GIM's, BCF's, and Glass Lewis's measures of
good governance are negatively related to the probability of disciplinary
turnover for poorly performing firms. These findings indicate that better
governed firms, as measured by those three indices, are less likely to expe-
rience disciplinary management turnover in spite of their poor perform-
ance. In addition, the interaction terms with the TCL compliance rating,
Gov-Score, and Gov-7 measures of good governance are unrelated to the
probability of disciplinary turnover for poorly performing firms. These
findings again appear to underscore the hazard of constructing a govern-
ance index using multiple indicators of board structure and processes,
charter provisions, and management compensation structure.
In sum, of all the measures of governance quality evaluated by
Bhagat and Bolton, only the outside directors' stock ownership measure
was related to multiple measures of performance, firms' future account-
ing profitability, and disciplinary management turnover upon poor per-
formance. This finding indicates more convincingly than the findings re-
garding accounting performance that the more complex measures of
firms' governance quality generated by index construction need not be
165. The finding that the probability of disciplinary CEO turnover (given poor prior
firm performance) increases with greater board independence is consistent with similar
findings in Hermalin & Weisbach, Survey, supra note 110, at 10-18.
166. This result is counterintuitive, given that a CEO-Chair is thought to be more
powerful, and hence more entrenched, than a CEO who is not chair. One speculative
explanation of this finding is that if the board is actively engaged in policymaking when the
CEO is not the chair, it is possible that it does not have to replace the CEO to implement a
new strategy to improve performance. This result would also seem to be contrary to the
implication of the prior finding that CEO-Chair duality is negatively related to overall
performance, or to indicate that the prior analysis may have obscured nonlinearities in the
relation between performance and governance, or that the relation between board
independence and structure, as represented by the identity of the chair, and CEO
entrenchment is more subtle than that suggested by the governance literature and the
relation captured by the system of equations la-ld.
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superior to a single governance variable. It also provides support for pro-
posals to compensate directors with stock. 16 7
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR INVESTORS AND POLICYMAKERS
The conclusion of our analysis of the relation between a variety of
measures of corporate performance and governance is that no one gov-
ernance index does very well, let alone clearly outperforms the other in-
dices or single governance components. This conclusion is at odds with
the findings of the index constructors. And, more importantly, it has
noteworthy implications for investors purchasing the products and ser-
vices of commercial governance index providers, as well as for regulators
and legislators.
A. Choice of an Index
The initial lesson that should be drawn from our analysis of the rela-
tion between governance and performance is that there is at present no
best governance index with which to identify a firm's governance quality.
The best measure of governance varies with the context for which it is to
be used, as different measures of good governance are correlated with
different performance measures. It is, as a consequence, not a straight-
forward matter to provide an appropriate proxy to investors who wish to
use governance to predict performance. For example, if accounting mea-
sures of performance are of concern, then the G and E indices may be
sensible measures to use. However, those measures are inappropriate if
167. Charles Elson has been a persistent proponent of outside director stock
compensation as a solution to governance problems. See, e.g., Charles M. Elson &
Christopher J. Gyves, The Enron Failure and Corporate Governance Reform, 38 Wake
Forest L. Rev. 855, 859 (2003) (issuing a "call for truly independent, equity-owning
directors as the solution to the governance conundrum raised by Enron and other
corporate debacles"); Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation-A Board-Based
Solution, 34 B.C. L. Rev. 937, 944 (1993) (proposing that "corporations ... pay their
directors their annual fees in restricted company stock"). If the incentive effects of equity
compensation for directors would be the same as for CEOs, then compensation through
stock options might be questionable, in light of research suggesting that CEO
compensation in stock options, as opposed to stock or restricted stock, is associated with
accounting improprieties. See Natasha Burns & Simi Kedia, The Impact of Performance-
Based Compensation on Misreporting, 79 J. Fin. Econ. 35, 63 (2006) (finding that CEO
stock option holdings are significantly related to accounting restatements but CEO
holdings in stock or restricted stock are not). However, the level of compensation
provided to directors is far less than that awarded to managers, a fact that should lessen the
risk of such perverse incentives from option compensation. Moreover, a recent paper
using a more refined matching statistical technique finds no relation between any form of
CEO equity incentive compensation and accounting improprieties. See Christopher S.
Armstrong et al., Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities
2-3, 22 (May 12, 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review),
available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1132411 (conducting
propensity matching of firms so as to differ solely on dimension of executive incentive
compensation, rather than on whether firm has issued a restatement).
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the performance criterion is whether top management will be replaced
following poor performance. Indeed, the single governance variable of
the median outside director's stock ownership is related to both of those
performance measures and thus that governance measure would serve
investors better than any of the indices.
Moreover, if future stock returns (the conventional performance
measure of concern to investors) are the focus of inquiry, then none of
the academic indices, nor the related commercial ones, is helpful. In
short, consumers of indices should be aware of the indices' considerable
limitations, as most consumers' investment purposes will, no doubt, not
be as narrowly focused as any one index's potential value-added. The
danger for investors, particularly the more poorly informed, is that indi-
ces can create the illusion of certainty regarding an assessment of firms'
governance quality, when reality is quite muddy. In our view, the infor-
mation gleaned about a firm from its ranking on an index should be
treated as merely one of many potential pieces of information that might
be relevant for fiduciaries' investing or voting decisions.
Beyond an agnostic perspective on the value of governance indices,
are there any further lessons to be drawn by institutional investors who, at
present, are the primary consumers of proprietary governance rating ser-
vices? As we have already noted, stock ownership of outside directors ap-
pears to offer a method of ranking firms' governance quality that is supe-
rior to the more complex governance indices. Director stock ownership
information is, of course, cheaper to acquire (it can be identified by self-
help without much difficulty). Should institutional investors accordingly
shun commercial products in favor of using median director equity stock
holdings as a proxy of quality, or is there some other value from their
use? Because investors purchasing governance services are sophisticated,
and often for-profit, institutions, it would not be plausible to conclude
that they have been manipulated by the marketers of the indices to
purchase a good or service with little value-added (although we do think
that some marketers are far too optimistic regarding the value-added of
their products1 68 ). Rather, to our minds, there are at least three explana-
tions that are not related to obtaining the best measure of the quality of
firms' corporate governance for why there is a flourishing market for the
products.
First, reliance on an index provider might be a relatively inexpensive
way of fulfilling fiduciary obligations for routine matters, in which institu-
tions can refer to an externally generated governance index for invest-
ment or proxy voting decisions (or the recommendation of the index
provider regarding the decision), even if it might lead to non-value-maxi-
168. Both Glass Lewis and ISS, for example, assert that their indices are positively
correlated with performance. See Glass, Lewis & Co., BAI, supra note 65; ISS Overview,
supra note 5.
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mizing decisions in some cases. 169 Second, it may offer institutions hold-
ing numerous portfolio finns a cost-effective means of obtaining informa-
tion about governance characteristics of specific interest to them: In
addition to their rankings, commercial services provide their customers
with the underlying data. Third, albeit more problematic in our view, a
firm's ranking on an index is easier for a fund manager to understand
and to explain to others as the basis for an investment or voting decision,
compared with recourse to a more complicated, multifaceted description
of a firm's combination of governance features.
However, the simple elegance of an index-in which one summary
number describes a complicated phenomenon-is its most perilous fea-
ture as well as its most promising. That is because, as we have hopefully
by now made clear, the idea that one number can capture everything an
investor needs to know about a firm's governance can be highly mislead-
ing. The interactions across governance components and a firm's operat-
ing environment are exceedingly complex and not self-evidently capable
of being collapsed into one dimension. Yet there is a seemingly instinc-
tive human predisposition that favors summary measures over more com-
plex data processing, as they reduce cognitive transaction costs by provid-
ing a ready-made means of comparison. 170
An analogy to financial asset pricing models illustrates the strong
human desire for simplicity in a muddled world. One of the most funda-
mental advances in modern finance was the capital asset pricing model,
169. For data suggestive of such an explanation, see Martijn Cremers & Roberta
Romano, Institutional Investors and Proxy Voting: The Impact of the 2003 Mutual Fund
Voting Disclosure Regulation 13 (Yale Program for Studies in Law, Econ. & Pub. Policy,
Research Paper No. 349, 2007), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstractid=982493 (on file with the Columbia Law Review). Cremers and Romano found
that mutual funds' voting support for management equity incentive compensation plan
proposals increased after the funds' votes had to be disclosed in firms with higher stock
ownership of outside directors. They offered as a possible explanation that the funds
began keying on this good governance feature-it is one of ISS's index components-as a
defensive strategy to deflect criticism against their supporting management in what had
become an increasingly controversial voting context. Moreover, Daines et al. offer several
reasons why ISS can be expected to use its governance ratings to determine its proxy voting
recommendations and provide evidence of a statistically significant, albeit very small,
positive relationship: A one-point increase in a firm's ISS governance rating increases the
probability of a recommendation in support of a management compensation plan
proposal by 0.0022. Daines et al., supra note 9, at 27-32. Although Daines et al. did not
find a consistently significant position relation between ISS's governance rating and voting
outcomes (it was sometimes negative, i.e., more support for firms with worse ratings), id.,
they did find that an ISS recommendation for a proposal increases voting support. Id. at
30-31, 53 tbl.7 panel C.
170. There is an extensive cognitive decisionmaking literature on consumer choice,
identifying individuals' use of simpler strategies to reduce complexity in the number of
products and product attributes compared in order to make a decision. For a summary of
that literature as it might apply to standard form contracts, see Russell Korobkin, Bounded
Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1203,
1225-29 (2003).
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which identified a single variable, beta, as the measure of an asset's risk
and hence the determinant of its market price.' 7t But a substantial body
of empirical research testing the model has rejected it, and some suggest
that multifactor models may do better at prediction. 172 Despite the ac-
cumulating evidence questioning the capital asset pricing model, it is still
used in both the academy and practice, and indeed remains the textbook
approach to asset pricing.1 73 As a prominent financial economist put it
in explaining beta's persistence, "[beta] is a simple, easy-to-understand
measure" even though "no single measure is likely to capture [an asset's
risk] adequately. 1 74 The proclivity to favor summary measures over
more complex multivariate valuations is, however, more troubling in the
case of governance indices than asset pricing models: In contrast to gov-
ernance indices, beta has a sound foundation in economic theory,'
75
whereas we have a near total absence of theoretical work on the interac-
tion of corporate governance institutions and performance. 176
171. Stephen A. Ross et al., Corporate Finance 284-87, 295 (7th ed. 2005).
172. Burton G. Malkiel, A Random Walk down Wall Street 206-14 (9th ed. 2007).
173. For the capital asset pricing model's centrality in the leading textbooks, see, e.g.,
Richard A. Brealey et al., Principles of Corporate Finance 214-22 (9th ed. 2008); Ross et
al., supra note 171, at 255-87. For real world use, see Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., The
Impact of Modem Finance Theory in Acquisition Cases, 53 Syracuse L. Rev. 1, 35 tbl.16
(2003) (finding that fifty-three percent of Delaware appraisal cases decided after the
Delaware Supreme Court permitted use of modern finance techniques used capital asset
pricing model or weighted average cost of capital for the discount rate calculation); John
R. Graham & Campbell R. Harvey, The Theory and Practice of Corporate Finance:
Evidence from the Field, 60J. Fin. Econ. 187, 203 fig.3 (2001) (finding that seventy-three
percent of surveyed CFOs used capital asset pricing method "always or almost always" to
estimate cost of capital).
174. Malkiel, supra note 172, at 214.
175. See Brealey et al., supra note 173, at 192-97 (discussing why beta measures a
security's risk in context of a portfolio). There is disagreement over the weight of the
evidence against beta, and as one leading textbook puts it:
There is no doubt that the evidence on the CAPM is less convincing than scholars
once thought. But it will be hard to reject the CAPM beyond all reasonable
doubt. Since data and statistics are unlikely to give final answers, the plausibility
of the CAPM theory will have to be weighed along with the empirical "facts."
Id. at 221.
176. For a very recent effort that would appear to be the first paper to attempt to
provide such a theory, modeling in a unified framework all of the following corporate
governance mechanisms: boards, executive compensation, shareholder voting and
activism, and the market for control, see Thomas H. Noe et al., Activists, Raiders, and
Directors: Opportunism and the Balance of Corporate Power I (Mar. 4, 2008)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=l102902. The value of the median
directors' stockholdings is, of course, also a single number that we have contended is a
better proxy for a firm's governance than any of the indices. In contrast to the indices and
similar to beta, there is an economic and political theory supporting its use, and the
empirical data reported supra Tables 1-5 corroborate its effectiveness.
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B. Choice of Regulatory Regime
A further important implication of the finding that any connection
between governance and performance varies by context (that is, by per-
formance measure or by firm characteristics) involves the appropriate
form of governance regulation: It should be selected so as to maximize
the flexibility afforded to adoption of standards. When the benefits from
a particular governance mechanism are dependent upon the context,
regulation must be sufficiently flexible to permit variation in governance
requirements to suit the situation. Governance regulations that are man-
dates decidedly do not meet such a criterion.
In particular, the research we have analyzed on the relation between
corporate governance and performance most definitely does not support
a one-size-fits-all approach to governance mandates. That approach has,
post-Enron, been the regulatory approach to governance preferred by
both Congress-as exemplified by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)-and
the stock exchanges-in their implementation and expansion of SOX re-
quirements, which are adopted as rules under the aegis of the SEC.
Those rules, as earlier noted, mandated most prominently that key board
committees consist only of independent directors. Mandates dictate
firms' adoption of governance components that the mandator considers
best practices, whether or not those practices are suitable for a particular
firm, just as an index ranks firms by how closely their practices accord
with what the index creator considers good governance rather than by
whether those "good governance" practices are a good fit. Because there
is no one best governance index-as we have discussed, none of the indi-
ces is correlated with many measures of performance widely thought to
be relevant, and by construction none takes into account the complex
relations among governance institutions-shoehorning firms into a uni-
form set of governance institutions could generate substantial costs for
investors without any appreciable benefit.
More specifically, the data indicating that good governance measures
are substitutes suggest that what is good governance for one firm need
not be good governance for another. Given such a relationship, it would
not be desirable for all firms to fulfill all components in a good govern-
ance index, because for some firms the provisions would be working at
cross purposes. Yet governance mandates require precisely that. For ex-
ample, the independent director mandates of SOX and the stock ex-
changes permit no exceptions, 1 77 and this requirement prevents firms
from adapting their governance institutions to fit their individual circum-
stances. As a consequence, firms can no longer engage in the govern-
177. See Standards Relating to Listed Company Audit Committees, 68 Fed. Reg.
18,788, 18,792-93 (Apr. 16, 2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, 249, 274);
Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate
Governance, 114 Yale LJ. 1521, 1595 n.214 (2005) (noting SEC's implementation of
SOX's audit committee mandate altered former stock exchange approach permitting
deviations from fully independent audit committees).
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ance tradeoff identified by GHS-as firms did before the adoption of
those mandates-by, for example, replacing independent boards with the
market for corporate control as the monitor of management in order to
obtain operational benefits from the expertise provided by nonindepen-
dent (affiliated) directors.
Although they are not phrased as mandates, the same issue arises
when activist institutional investors and their advocacy organizations,
such as the CII, advance the adoption of uniform governance institutions
by their advocacy of conformance to a best practices list.178 The objective
of a "best practices" approach is equivalent to that of a regulatory man-
date: to have all firms adopt identical governance institutions. Of course
there is a difference between best-practice advocacy and actual mandates:
Best-practice advocates can only seek their preferred governance re-
gime's effectuation by shareholder proposals and other forms of pressure
on individual firms (such as withholding votes from directors or engaging
in media campaigns against management), whereas a government man-
date attains compliance across the board by fiat. But that difference does
not make the private advocacy of conformance with a best practices list
approach appreciably less troubling.
An example of the problematic aspect of this private sector version
of governance mandates is the policy position of many activist investors
that firms should repeal defensive tactics. 179 GHS's finding that firms
with strong, independent boards adopt numerous takeover defenses sug-
gests that efforts to remove defenses may well be misguided by disregard-
ing the need for governance tradeoffs. For some firms, board monitoring
appears to substitute for the market for control: GHS speculate that take-
over defenses are adopted by boards to obtain the benefit of avoiding
myopic behavior, such as underinvestment, by managers concerned
about takeover threats.' 8 0
The parallelism noted between regulatory mandates and institu-
tional investor activists' best practices approach leads to a further ques-
tion regarding the efficacy of "comply-or-explain" governance regimes,
which are usually characterized in the literature as the alternative to the
United States's mandatory approach.1 8 ' Comply-or-explain is the ap-
proach to governance taken by regulators in, among others, Canada, the
178. See, e.g., Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys., supra note 11, at 7.
179. See, e.g., id. at 16-17.
180. Gillan et al., supra note 115, at 24-26. For a model of managerial myopia in
response to takeovers, see Jeremy C. Stein, Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia, 96J.
Pol. Econ. 61, 61 (1988).
181. See, e.g., George S. Dallas & Hal S. Scott, Mandating Corporate Behavior: Can
One Set of Rules Fit All? 18 (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law
Review), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sot3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=907346
(identifying U.K/European comply-or-explain model as "viable ... alternative" or "rival"
to the United States's prescriptive approach).
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United Kingdom, and many nations of the European Union.18 2 Under
this regulatory approach, firms must either comply with a list of best prac-
tices or disclose the reason for any noncompliance.
The best practices lists underlying a comply-or-explain regime are, in
essence, governance indices in which each item on the list is equivalent to
one of the components in an equally weighted index. This is because the
regulator expects firms to comply with all of the approved practices on its
list, and full compliers are considered firms with the best governance.
That is the import of requiring firms to explain a failure to comply: The
presumption is that firms should comply, for otherwise there would be no
reason to require an explanation for nonconformance. Likewise, the
constructor of an index considers it desirable for all firms to have all in-
dex components, such that the firm with the maximum sum (highest
value of the index) is identified as the one with the highest quality
governance.
Because noncompliers in a comply-or-explain regime have the bur-
den of explaining away their decisions, noncompliance can have a chil-
ling effect, dissuading management from adopting governance mecha-
nisms that would otherwise be beneficial (i.e., the requirement of an
explanation for noncompliance could be taken to imply that something is
awry). But if no one index is associated with better governance objectives
in all contexts-as we have seen, for instance, in the reversal of the effec-
tiveness rankings of the G and E indices going from operating perform-
ance to disciplinary management turnover as the performance measure
under consideration-then that is no doubt also true of adherence to any
one best practices list. Accordingly, requiring firms to justify noncompli-
ance is inappropriate and may be imposing needless costs. Consistent
with this contention, the bulk of the empirical studies of comply-or-ex-
plain regimes investigating whether firms in compliance with best prac-
tices are superior performers to noncompliant firms find that compliers
do not outperform noncompliers.' 8 3
182. See Paul L. Davies, Introduction to Company Law 131 (2002) (discussing U.K.
approach); Statement of the European Corporate Governance Forum on the Comply-or-
Explain Principle 1 (Feb. 22, 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internalmarket/
company/docs/ecgforum/ecgf-comply-explain-en.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (European Union); Anita Anand et al., Voluntary Adoption of Corporate
Governance Mechanisms 2 (May 10, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
Columbia Law Review), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=92
1450 (Canada).
183. Cf. Nikoe Vafeas & Elena Theodorou, The Relationship Between Board
Structure and Firm Performance in the UK, 30 Brit. Acct. Rev. 383, 384-85 (1998) (finding
no relation between certain board attributes-many included in the U.K. best practices
list-and performance); Charlie Weir et al., Internal and External Governance
Mechanisms: Their Impact on the Performance of Large UK Companies, 29J. Bus. Fin. &
Acct. 579, 581 (2002) ("We find only weak evidence that board structural mechanisms
[such as those included in the U.K. best practices list] affect performance . . . ."); Carol
Padgett & Amama Shabbir, The UK Code of Corporate Governance: Link Between
Compliance and Firm Performance 15-25 (Univ. of Reading ICMA Ctr., Discussion Paper
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The upshot is that in selecting a governance regulatory regime, a
disclosure regime without reference to a comparative benchmark would
be a more appropriate regulatory framework than a comply-or-explain or
a mandatory governance regime, as such a disclosure regime would be
most consistent with the spirit of the findings of the governance litera-
ture.18 4 That is because a straightforward disclosure approach of a firm's
governance features does not attempt to identify best practices and thus
avoids the illusion that we are in possession of knowledge that we obvi-
ously do not have. In a governance disclosure regime, firms do not have
to explain why they follow a specific governance practice, whether or not
it differs from that of other firms. They disclose their governance struc-
tures, and investors are left to make of it what they will. Such a regime
would, in all likelihood, impose some informational costs on investors
compared to a comply-or-explain regime, since it is altogether conceiva-
ble that it would be more difficult to compare firms on governance
dimensions, as the disclosures will not reference a benchmark-the hall-
mark of the comply-or-explain approach. But that is the precise advan-
tage of a disclosure-only regime. It would eliminate the false promise that
is embodied in a best practices list or governance index: that a set of
practices exists, known with any substantial degree of certainty, against
which all firms should be benchmarked.
It is possible that a disclosure regime might have a minor chilling
effect on firms, as disclosing practices that deviate from the disclosed
No. DP2005-17, 2005) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (finding positive relation
between compliance-using index of what authors consider "spirit" of compliance rather
than "formal" compliance used in other studies-and performance as measured by capital
gains and dividends, but finding no relation between authors' compliance index and
accounting measures of performance). But see Igor Goncharov et al., Does Compliance
with the German Corporate Governance Code Have an Impact on Stock Valuation? An
Empirical Analysis, 14 Corp. Governance 432, 442 (2006) (finding compliance by German
firms-as defined by deviations from governance code-to be positively related to non-
market-adjusted stock returns and prices). Moreover, the literature investigating the
impact of key governance mechanisms included in the best practices lists of the major
comply-or-explain regimes is consistent with those results: Independent boards are
consistently not associated with superior performance, nor are firms with separate CEOs
and board chairs. See Elisabeth Dedman, The Cadbury Committee Recommendations on
Corporate Governance-A Review of Compliance and Performance Impacts, 4 Int'l J.
Mgmt. Rev. 335, 336 (2002) (reviewing studies on impact of board independence and
duality to evaluate whether United Kingdom's comply-or-explain regime has improved
performance); supra notes 24 and 149 (collecting references to studies on independent
boards and board duality, respectively).
184. We do not in this paper address the normative question concerning the
appropriate level of governance regulation in a federal political system such as the United
States. As one of us has maintained, if a disclosure regime is the preferable governance
regime, as we advocate here, then a competitive regulatory system in which each firm
chooses its regulator will generate that mode of regulation, given regulatory competition's
alignment of incentives and interests among issuers, investors, and regulators. See Roberta
Romano, The Advantage of Competitive Federalism for Securities Regulation 172-74
(2002).
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practices of a majority of firms might cause some investors to question a
firm for nonconformance. In such a scenario, firms whose governance
regimes were nonconforming to most other firms or some prominent in-
vestors' or proxy advisory services' governance checklists might feel
pressed to explain their institutional arrangements. We think that such a
scenario is unlikely, but were that to be the case, in contrast to a man-
dated comply-or-explain regime, such pressure to conform would be gen-
erated by financial markets. This is the more appropriate source of give-
and-take in the pricing of stock, as opposed to the dictates of a regulatory
authority.18 5
A final regulatory issue concerns the implication of the analysis for
firms in other nations. In recent years, corporate governance has been
emphasized across the globe, with the World Bank advocating emerging
markets' adoption of best practices similar to those emphasized by institu-
tional investor activists and included in the commercial services' govern-
ance indices evaluating U.S. firms.186 Is the same agnostic approach to
185. lain MacNeil and Xiao Li provide some evidence that explanations offered by
noncompliers in the United Kingdom's comply-or-explain regime are not of concern to
investors, at least when the firm's stock is performing well. See lain MacNeil & Xiao Li,
"Comply or Explain": Market Discipline and Non-Compliance with the Combined Code,
14 Corp. Governance 486, 488-92 (2006) (finding that share prices of U.K. comply-or-
explain noncompliers outperformed the market but that firms' explanations of
noncompliance were, in the authors' view, completely uninformative and could therefore
not have served as bases for investor decisions to accept noncompliance). The authors
therefore hypothesize that it is simpler for investors to ignore the reasons for
noncompliance and instead to require proof that noncompliance "works," that is, to use
stock performance as a proxy for the merits of noncompliance with code features. See id.
at 489-90.
186. The World Bank has hosted programs to encourage nations to adopt corporate
governance reforms, such as the 3rd OECD/World Bank Asian Corporate Governance
Roundtable held in Singapore in April 2001, and has sponsored research to identify the
relation between development and legal variables involving good governance, more
broadly defined in terms of the business and legal environment and finance-related law
reforms protecting property and contract rights. Cf. Legal Vice Presidency, World Bank,
Initiatives in Legal and Judicial Reform 8 (2002), available at http://siteresources.world
bank.org/BRAZILINPOREXTN/Resources/3817166-1185895645304/4044168-118640916
9154/18initiativesFinal.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("Promoting markets
and private sector development frequently requires reform in areas such as finance and
banking laws, companies law, corporate governance and insolvency, infrastructure and
property rights."); Kevin E. Davis, What Can the Rule of Law Variable Tell Us About Rule
of Law Reforms, 26 Mich. J. Int'l L. 141, 145 (2004) (discussing methodologies of various
studies and noting that "[a]ll of these studies generally find positive correlations between
the legal variables that they employ and measures of development, and their results are
commonly cited in key World Bank publications advocating legal reforms in developing
countries"). More specifically, the International Finance Corporation (IFC), a financing
arm of the World Bank, has emphasized adoption of corporate governance best practices
by firms in the emerging markets in which it operates. Mike Lubrano, Why Corporate
Governance?, Dev. Outreach, Mar. 2003, available at http://wwwl.worldbank.org/devout
reach/march03/article.asp?id=194 (on file with the Columbia Law Review); see also CurtisJ.
Milhaupt & Katharina Pistor, Law and Capitalism 2 (2008) (noting pressure from
"international organizations such as the World Bank" on countries facing governance
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governance that we advocate for U.S. firms sensible to apply to firms op-
erating in developing economies? The empirical research supporting
our analysis of governance indices, and hence of best practices ap-
proaches, of course only examines the relation between governance and
performance of U.S. firms and is therefore not directly applicable to
firms in other environments.
We believe that the background components of good governance re-
garding a legal and political system may be more universal, and more
important for corporate performance, than firms' own corporate govern-
ance. For example, the rule of law-which includes respect for property
rights and an independent judiciary-and anti-corruption efforts are
likely to have a greater impact on corporate growth and performance
than are firm-level corporate governance reforms.' 8 7 Despite the intui-
tive plausibility of the assumption that such legal and political institutions
are universally desirable, within the law and development literature the
premise that economic development is associated with improvements in
the rule of law is contested, and some commentators believe that local
culture, organization, and context are critical in defining the relation be-
tween "rule of law" institutions and economic development. 8 8 That liter-
ature suggests that even when considering the essentials of a modern le-
gal system, tailoring reforms on a country-by-country basis may be
preferable to a "one-size-fits-all" approach. From such a perspective,
there would accordingly be no reason to advocate a different corporate
governance approach for emerging markets than we advocate for devel-
oped ones.
Further complicating any extrapolation from our analysis of the rela-
tion between performance and governance in U.S. firms is a difference in
corporate organization across nations. For instance, our finding regard-
ing the importance of outside directors' stock ownership for corporate
crises to adopt legal reforms inspired by "recent economics scholarship linking favorable
economics outcomes to 'good' law").
187. This is the perspective of the World Bank's Doing Business project, which tries to
measure features of law and development, determine the relationships between those
features, develop benchmarks for assessing legal systems, and suggest reforms (as a
condition for financing), although the project's approach is not without its critics. For a
summary and critique of the World Bank's approach, see Kevin E. Davis & Michael B.
Kruse, Taking the Measure of Law: The Case of the Doing Business Project, 32 Law & Soc.
Inquiry 1095, 1095 (2007).
188. For a thorough literature review and discussion of these law and development
issues, see Kevin E. Davis & Michael J. Trebilcock, The Relationship Between Law and
Development: Optimists Versus Skeptics, 57 Am. J. Comp. L. (forthcoming 2009),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 11 24045&rec= I&srcabs=
1105209 (manuscript at 1, on file with the Columbia Law Review); Michael J. Trebilcock &
Ronald J. Daniels, Rule of Law Reform and Development 1-42, 332-55 (2008). Curtis
Milhaupt and Katarina Pistor also contend that different legal systems are appropriate for
different countries, thereby rendering the relation between law and economic
development nonuniform, although their explanatory focus is on political economy rather
than cultural sources of differences. See Milhaupt & Pistor, supra note 186, at 219-24.
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performance may not be relevant to firms in emerging markets because
of dramatic differences in corporate ownership structures across nations.
The primary agency problem for public corporations in the United States
(along with the United Kingdom) is between managers and shareholders,
and those firms' governance mechanisms are accordingly directed at
resolving that agency problem. In contrast, in most emerging markets,
the primary agency problem is between a dominant shareholder and mi-
nority shareholders (the manager-shareholder agency problem is not as
severe because the dominant shareholder is often the manager or has
very good incentives to provide close monitoring of the manager). Ac-
cordingly, greater stock ownership of outside directors, which would ap-
pear to mitigate agency problems in developed markets, may well be less
effective in emerging markets.
C. Caveats for Courts
Finally, we offer the following cautionary note for courts. We are not
aware of governance indices having been a subject ofjudicial notice. But
it would seem plausible to expect the plaintiffs' bar in shareholder litiga-
tion in due course to seek to employ the evidentiary power of low govern-
ance ratings (given marketers' emphasis on a link between indices and
performance). Plaintiffs, that is, could attempt to bolster fiduciary
breach claims with reference to firms' governance failures as identified by
commercial indices and scholarly articles that find some relation between
performance and an index.
In that eventuality, we suggest that courts should evaluate such
claims with more than a few grains of salt and should consider, for in-
stance, whether the alleged breach can be related to a context in which
the governance measure to which the plaintiff refers is associated with
better performance, or whether the firm rates low on all governance indi-
ces, including single dimensions that have been found to be of equal or
superior value to an index. Such considerations might make for a more
plausible claim that the firm's quality of governance is poor. But even
then, we do not think that it should be probative for determining direc-
tors' negligence or trumping the applicability of the business judgment
rule. Rather, we think it would be more appropriate for a court to re-
quire a plaintiff to be able to establish a nexus between the governance
failure (the low score's source) and some action or inaction of the board
producing the harm at issue.
CONCLUSION
The renewed focus on corporate governance following the collapse
of Enron and other financial scandals has hastened the creation of gov-
ernance indices, marketed primarily to institutional investors, as mea-
sures of firms' governance quality that can be used to inform investment
and proxy voting decisions. The notion animating index construction is
that because corporate governance operates on many dimensions, it is of
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value to combine the numerous elements of a firm's governance system
into one number representing the quality of the firm's governance. The
effort to construct a good index-by academics as well as commercial
providers of governance services-is considered urgent by many in the
belief that corporate performance is a function of good governance.
While identifying a measure of governance quality is a commendable
idea in theory, in practice the existing indices fail to capture the diverse
ways in which governance operates in firms for two reasons. First, no one
index can predict a firm's performance on all of the performance mea-
sures that are thought to be important to investors. Indeed, a simple,
single governance variable, the median outside director's stock owner-
ship, performs better than the leading academic indices, as it is positively
correlated with more performance measures. Second, indices are con-
structed so as to treat all component governance mechanisms as comple-
ments, when the data suggest that several such mechanisms are actually
substitutes for, and not complements to, each other, and the relation ap-
pears to vary across firm characteristics and industry sectors. In short,
one size does not fit all. Good governance is best understood as highly
context-specific, something that even the best-constructed index simply
cannot capture and convey.
These limitations on the effectiveness of an index have two broad
policy implications. First, the most widespread forms of governance regu-
lation need to be rethought because they mimic the approach of indices:
Both prescriptive mandates (the U.S. approach post-Enron) and comply-
or-explain regimes (the approach of most other developed economies,
including Canada, the United Kingdom, and continental Europe) iden-
tify governance institutions that all firms are expected to adopt. A more
appropriate regulatory approach, in our view, is a straightforward govern-
ance disclosure regime, which is fully cognizant of the costs and benefits
of disclosure. Such a regime acknowledges that there is no one best
benchmark or set of best practices that is appropriate for all, or even
most, firms. Second, investors should treat indices for what they are: one
of a multitude of pieces of information of possible interest about firms'
quality that cannot predict future stock market performance.
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APPENDIX A: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INDICES
A. Academic Governance Indices
1. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick's G-Index. - The groupings of the gov-
ernance provisions in the index are as follows:
(1) "Delay": Four provisions for delaying hostile takeover bidders
(the presence of blank check preferred stock, a classified board,
restrictions on shareholders' ability to call special meetings, and
restrictions on shareholders' ability to act by written consent);
(2) "Voting": Six provisions involving shareholder voting rights (the
presence of cumulative voting, confidential voting,
supermajority voting for business combinations, dual class stock,
and limitations to shareholders' ability to amend the bylaws or
certificate of incorporation);
(3) "Protection": Six provisions protecting directors and officers
from legal liability or compensating them for termination (lim-
ited liability provisions, indemnification provisions in charters or
bylaws, indemnification contracts, golden parachutes, severance
contracts not conditioned on control changes, and compensa-
tion plans with changes-in-control provisions);
(4) "Other": Six other takeover defenses (the presence of an-
tigreenmail charter provisions, fair price provisions, other con-
stituent provisions, poison pills, silver parachutes, and pension
parachutes);
(5) "State": Incorporation in a state with one of six state takeover
laws (antigreenmail, business combination freeze, control share
acquisition, fair price, other constituencies, and redemption
rights statutes).
Because of overlap between some of the tracked firm-level provisions and
state takeover laws, the twenty-eight tracked provisions are collapsed into
twenty-four unique provisions. Note that the groupings can be ques-
tioned for lack of internal coherence. For example, blank check pre-
ferred is classified in the "delay" category, but it is used in the creation of
poison pills, which are placed in the "other" category.
2. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell's E-Index. - The subset of provisions in
the G-Index (GIM's grouping in parentheses) are as follows:
(1) Classified boards (Delay);
(2) Limitations to shareholders' ability to amend the bylaws
(Voting);
(3) Supermajority voting for business combinations (Voting);
(4) Supermajority requirements for charter amendments (Voting);
(5) Poison pills (Other);
(6) Golden parachutes (Protection).
3. Brown and Caylor's Gov-Score Index. - The groupings of ISS mini-
mally acceptable corporate governance standards comprising Gov-Score
(factors also in the G-Index are in italics) are as follows:
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(1) "Audit" (four factors): Audit committee consists solely of inde-
pendent outside directors; auditors ratified by shareholders at
most recent annual meeting; consulting fees paid to auditors less
than audit fees paid; company has formal policy on auditor
rotation;
(2) "Board of directors" (seventeen factors): Managers respond to
shareholder proposals within twelve months of meeting; CEO
serves on no more than two other public corporation boards; all
directors attended at least 75% of board meetings or had valid
excuse for non-attendance; size of board between six and fif-
teen; no former CEO is a director; no CEO related-party transac-
tions listed in proxy; board has more than 50% independent
outside directors; compensation committee comprised solely of
independent outside directors; CEO and chair positions are sep-
arated or lead director is specified; shareholders vote on direc-
tors selected to fill vacancies; annual director elections; shareholder
approval to change board size; nominating committee com-
prised solely of independent outside directors; governance com-
mittee meets at least once a year; cumulative voting rights; board
guidelines in proxy statement; policy requiring outside directors
to serve on no more than five additional boards;
(3) "Charter/bylaws" (seven factors): Majority vote for merger, no
poison pill or shareholder approved pill; shareholders can call special
meetings; majority vote to amend charter or bylaws; shareholders may act
by nonunanimous written. consent; no blank check preferred stock; board
cannot amend bylaws without shareholder approval or can do so only
under limited circumstances;
(4) "Director education" (one factor): At least one director has par-
ticipated in ISS-accredited director education program;
(5) "Executive and director compensation" (ten factors): No inter-
locking directors on compensation committee; nonemployees
do not participate in pension plans; no option repricing in past
three years; shareholder approval of stock incentive plans; direc-
tors receive all or part of fees in stock; no corporate loans to
executives to exercise options; last time shareholders voted on
pay plan ISS did not deem the cost to be excessive; average op-
tions granted in past three years as percentage of basic shares
outstanding no more than 3% ("option burn rate"); prohibition
on option repricing; stock options are expensed;
(6) "Ownership" (four factors): All directors with more than one
year of service own stock; officers' and directors' stock owner-
ship at least 1% and not over 30%; executives subject to stock
ownership guidelines; directors subject to stock ownership
guidelines;
(7) "Progressive practices" (seven factors): Mandatory retirement
age for directors; board performance regularly reviewed; board-
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approved CEO succession plan in place; board has outside advi-
sors; directors must submit resignation upon change in job sta-
tus; outside directors meet without CEO and disclose number of
times they meet; director term limits;
(8) "State of incorporation" (one factor): Incorporation in state
with no takeover statutes.
All of the factors in ISS's "charter/bylaw" grouping are also in the G-
Index; the remaining G-Index components included in Gov-Score are in
the "board of directors" category. In addition, although Brown and
Caylor do not identify the state of incorporation factor as in the G-Index,
it is essentially a composite of the four components in that index's "State"
grouping.
The subset of factors in Gov-7 (ISS grouping in parentheses; factors
also in the E-Index in italics) are as follows:
(1) Annual director elections (Board of directors);
(2) No poison pill or shareholder approved pill (Charter/bylaws);
(3) No option repricing in past three years (Executive and director
compensation);
(4) Directors subject to stock ownership guidelines (Ownership);
(5) All directors attended at least 75% of board meetings or had
valid excuse for non-attendance (Board of directors);
(6) Average options granted in past three years as percentage of ba-
sic shares outstanding no more than 3% (Executive and director
compensation);
(7) Board guidelines are in each proxy statement (Board of
directors).
Gov-7 was created by selecting the factors that were significant in two
of three statistical approaches used to determine which of the fifty-one
factors in Gov-Score drove the relation identified between that index and
firm value:
(1) A regression of Tobin's Q on the fifty-one factors and controls;
(2) BCF's methodology, which separately regresses Tobin's Q on
each factor, Gov-Score minus the factor, and controls;
(3) Stepwise regression using a forward-selection technique in which
variables are retained if they are significant at 10% (two-tailed
test).
B. Proprietary Governance Indices
1. The Corporate Library's Board Effectiveness Rating. - The Corporate
Library (TCL), an investor research firm established by investor activist
Nell Minow, produces research reports and commentary on corporate
governance and does not provide consulting or other services to firms
that it evaluates. It has developed a proprietary measure of the quality of
firms' governance, which measures a "Board's Effectiveness," and is a let-
ter grade from A to F, representing an assessment of the effectiveness of
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four governance components of the company's governance quality. The
components of the rating are as follows:
(1) Board Composition and Succession Planning;
(2) CEO Compensation;
(3) Takeover Defenses;
(4) Board Level Accounting Concerns.
TCL notes that its rating focuses on "board actions [rather than] board
policies and structures," with the exception of the specific board composi-
tion component (number (1) above). 18 9 The component analysis is not
based on compliance with a best practices "checklist" but on quantitative
screens related to board behavior and decisionmaking and on what it
considers to be poor governance practices, containing "more than 1,100
individual data points."190 The quantitative screening is supplemented by
the more subjective analysis of its staff to compute the final rating.
TCL has also calculated a Best Practices Compliance score or bench-
mark, developed from other organizations' guidelines, that ranged from
0 to 100, and included such factors as whether the firm has a classified
board, majority outside directors, independent chair or lead director, au-
dit committee of only independent directors, formal governance policy,
and the characteristics of directors (number who are over seventy years
old, serve on more than four other boards, and have more than fifteen
years of service). However, it considered the effectiveness rating and not
the compliance score as the preferable metric of a company's governance
quality, and it no longer refers to the compliance benchmark in the pub-
licly available material on its website.
2. GovernanceMetrics International's Market and Industry Indices. -
GovernanceMetrics International is an international governance rating
organization, founded by individuals experienced in the investor rela-
tions and advising industry, that markets research and analyses principally
to institutional investors. It provides advisory services to a variety of non-
profit organizations, such as stock exchanges, as well as to investors, but it
does not provide proxy voting advisory services. Its "overall rating" gov-
ernance score, which ranges from one to ten and is derived from a statis-
tical algorithm assigning numerical values to individual metrics falling
within six general governance areas, is computed as a comparative score
based on the governance practices and policies of other firms in the rated
company's home state or region (the "home market" rating) or all firms
in GMI's universe (the "global" rating). The governance areas ("Re-
search Categories") are as follows:
(1) Board Accountability;
(2) Financial Disclosure and Internal Controls;
(3) Shareholder Rights;
(4) Executive Compensation;
189. The Corp. Library, Assessment, supra note 5.
190. Id.
18732008]
HeinOnline -- 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1873 2008
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
(5) Market for Control and Ownership Base;
(6) Corporate Behavior and Corporate Social Responsibility Issues.
3. Institutional Shareholder Services's Corporate Governance Quotient. -
ISS is the market leader in the provision of proxy advisory and corporate
governance services to institutional investors. It also provides governance
and proxy consulting services to issuers. It has been in the advisory busi-
ness for over two decades, during which it acquired competitors and ex-
panded its services (acquiring most recently the proxy research firm
IRRC in 2005, before it was itself acquired in 2006). ISS rates companies
according to a "Corporate Governance Quotient," which is derived from
sixty-three governance factors (also referred to as governance criteria)
that are grouped into four key governance areas, combining eight gov-
ernance categories on which companies are evaluated. The weights as-
signed to the individual components are a function of their correlations
with performance measures. The ratings are calculated as percentages
indicating where a firm stands in relation to other firms in its industry or
market. For example, a value of 97.5 means that the company out-
performed 97.5% of firms in its industry or stock market index, according
to ISS's statistical algorithm combining governance factors. The govern-
ance areas and weights are as follows:




The eight most important governance variables that enter into the
rating, in order of their weighting are
(1) Audit committee with all independent outside directors;
(2) Average options granted in past three years are no more than
2% of basic shares outstanding, or within one standard deviation
of industry mean ("option burn rate");
(3) All audit committee members are financial experts;
(4) Board controlled by supermajority (over 90%) of independent
outside directors;
(5) Board has only one nonindependent director;
(6) Directors subject to stock ownership requirements;
(7) Board controlled by supermajority (between 75% and 90%) of
independent outsiders;
(8) Incorporation in state with no takeover statutes.
The sixteen performance measures ISS used to test its governance
rating factors, which are divided into four categories of performance, are
as follows:
(1) Risk (two measures): Volatility; Altman's Z-score (probability of
bankruptcy);
(2) Market (two measures): Total Shareholder Return; Tobin's Q
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(3) Valuation (three ratio measures): Price to Book; Price to Cash
Flow; Price to Earnings;
(4) Profitability (nine measures): Dividend; Return on Invested
Capital; Return on Equity; Return on Investment; Cash Flow
Return on Investment; Net Profit Margin; EBITDA Margin; Sales
Growth; Free Cash Flow to Sales.
The factors that ISS uses change over time, reflecting changing
trends in corporate governance. For example, it no longer includes a
factor for whether firms expense options, because that accounting treat-
ment is now required and no longer voluntary. In addition, it now in-
cludes a factor for whether the company has majority-vote director elec-
tions-a governance issue that first appeared on activist institutional
investors' agendas in any serious form in 2005-and a factor for whether
the company has backdated options, an accounting issue-some would
call it a scandal-that first came to light in 2006.
4. Egan-Jones Proxy Services's Corporate Governance Ratings. - Egan-
Jones Proxy Services provides assistance in proxy voting, offering re-
search, recommendations, and voting services (such as automated vote
execution, recordkeeping, and vote disclosure reporting). Although its
affiliated business has provided credit rating analysis for many years, it
began to offer proxy recommendations commercially in 2003 (in con-
junction with the increased emphasis on corporate governance and par-
ticularly the new SEC regulations regarding disclosure of mutual funds'
voting). In addition to offering general voting services evaluating the im-
pact on shareholder value, it provides voting guidelines tailored to cer-
tain labor union funds' needs, which ensure that "the rights and interests
of labor are respected."1 9 1 Egan-Jones provides an "overall" rating and






How, if at all, it combines the five factors into an overall rating is not
publicly disclosed. All six ratings are in the form of letter grades (with
pluses and minuses).
5. Glass, Lewis & Company's Board Accountability Index. - Glass, Lewis
& Company, which provides research and advisory services to institutional
investors, was established in 2003 by Lynn Turner, Chief Accountant of
the Securities and Exchange Commission during Arthur Levitt's chair-
manship. It markets a governance ranking, termed the "Board Accounta-
bility Index," that is derived from BCF's research, and which it considers
191. Egan-Jones Proxy Servs., About Egan-Jones Proxy, at http://www.ejproxy.com/
about.aspx (last visited Oct. 23, 2008) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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a "governance-enhanced" S&P 500 index.19 2 It uses a "modified market-
cap weighting algorithm" that adjusts an S&P 500 index company's
weight by the presence or absence of five of the six components of BCF's
entrenchment index. 19 3 The component that Glass Lewis excludes is the
supermajority requirement for charter amendments.
192. Glass, Lewis & Co., BAI, supra note 65.
193. Id.
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APPENDIX B: NOTE ON INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES ANALYSIS
The Article's results and findings regarding the relative performance
of governance indices in predicting corporate performance rely on
Bhagat and Bolton's analysis of the interrelationships among corporate
governance, firm performance, capital structure, and ownership struc-
ture, using the set of simultaneous equations described supra Part II.C
(equations la-ld).194 This Appendix reviews their choice of instruments
for the dependent variables of performance, governance, ownership, and
capital structure, and the results of statistical tests indicating the appro-
priateness of using the instrumental variables methodology to identify the
relation between governance and performance.
A. Choice of Instrumental Variables
1. Performance: Treasury Stock. - Palia suggests that a firm is most
likely to buy back its stock when it believes the stock to be underpriced
relative to where the managers think the price should be.195 This sug-
gests that the level of treasury stock should be correlated with firm per-
formance and firm value, but there is no reason to believe it is correlated
with the other regressors, thus making it a valid instrument for
performance.
2. Governance: Currently Active CEOs on Board. - Prior researchers
have emphasized the role of networks among CEOs that serve on boards,
and the adverse impact on the governance of such firms. 196 Ex ante, this
variable should be correlated with governance, but there is no reason to
believe it will be correlated with performance. The percentage of direc-
tors who are currently active CEOs is therefore used as an instrument for
governance.
3. Governance: Director Ownership. - Several studies suggest that the
percentage of stock owned by a firm's directors may be a governance or
194. See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
195. See Darius Palia, The Endogeneity of Managerial Compensation in Firm
Valuation: A Solution, 14 Rev. Fin. Stud. 735, 743-44 (2001).
196. See, e.g., Kevin F. Hallock, Reciprocally Interlocking Boards of Directors and
Executive Compensation, 32 J. Fin. & Quantitative Analysis 331, 332-40 (1997) (finding
that managers of firms whose boards have certain reciprocally interlocking director
relationships enjoy higher compensation than managers at firms whose boards lack such
relationships); James D. Westphal & Poonam Khanna, Keeping Directors in Line: Social
Distancing as a Control Mechanism in the Corporate Elite, 48 Admin. Sci. Q. 361, 363,
385-91 (2003) (summarizing theoretical literature on social effects of interlocking board
membership and finding that directors who take actions contrary to interests of managers
are subjected to social sanctioning by directors on other boards of which they are
members).
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monitoring mechanism. 19 7 Thus, it should be correlated with the govern-
ance measures. However, other research finds no consistent relationship
between percentage stock ownership of directors and performance.
198
These findings suggest that director ownership could also make a valid
instrument for governance in the performance equation.
4. Ownership: CEO Tenure-to-Age. - A CEO with five years of tenure
at age 65 is likely to be of different quality and have a different equity
ownership than a CEO with five years of tenure at age 50. These CEOs
likely have different incentives and reputational and career concerns. 199
Therefore, we use the ratio of CEO tenure to CEO age as a measure of
CEO quality and as an instrument for CEO ownership.
5. Leverage: Altman's Z-Score. - Following the literature, the modi-
fied Altman's Z-score, which is a measure of the probability a firm will go
bankrupt, is used as the instrument for leverage. 20 0 In robustness tests,
lagged leverage is also used as an instrument for leverage; the results us-
ing this alternative instrument are qualitatively unchanged.
B. Evaluating the Instrumental Variables Estimation
Bhagat and Bolton's analysis involved three steps:
197. See, e.g., Core et al., Corporate Governance, supra note 147, at 374-75, 388-89
(summarizing prior literature on effects of director stock ownership and finding that
presence of five percent outside blockholder or non-CEO inside director correlates with
lower CEO compensation); Linck et al., supra note 40, at 312, 320 (examining effects of
director stock ownership and reporting results "consistent with the notion that fewer
outside monitors are needed when each director has stronger incentives to monitor").
198. See Sanjai Bhagat et al., Director Ownership, Corporate Performance, and
Management Turnover, 54 Bus. Law. 885, 904-08 (1999).
199. For evidence on this hypothesis, see Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, Optimal
Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence, 100J. Pol.
Econ. 468, 478-86 (1992).
200. See Edward I. Altman, Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis, and the
Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy, 23J. Fin. 589, 594-98 (1968) (developing original Z-
score as predictor of corporate bankruptcy); Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason, Do Taxes Affect
Corporate Financing Decisions?, 45 J. Fin. 1471, 1475-76 (1990) (using Altman's Z-score
"to measure [firm] financial condition" in study of tax effects on "choice between issuing
debt and equity"); Ivan E. Brick et al., The Joint Impact of Corporate Governance
Mechanisms on Firm Performance and Each Other 17 (Nov. 2006) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review) (using "MacKie-Mason's ... modified
Altman's Z-score" as "proxy for [a firm's] financial distress" and "expect[ing] a positive
relationship between leverage and [modified Altman Z-score]"). Ultimately, whether this
is an appropriate instrument is an empirical question. Through the diagnostic tests
discussed infra in this Appendix, Bhagat and Bolton determined that the Altman's Z-score
is indeed a valid instrument for leverage. See Bhagat & Bolton, supra note 40, at 263, 268
(noting that authors used "modified Altman's Z-score ... suggested in MacKie-Mason
(1990) as instrument for leverage" and confirming appropriateness of that use through
application of various validity and strength tests). They also considered using marginal tax
rate as an instrument for leverage, but it failed the Stock and Yogo weak instruments test,
discussed infra note 201 and accompanying text, and was consequently not used.
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(1) Estimate the system of equations (la-ld) using OLS, 2SLS, and
3SLS;
(2) Check the validity of the instruments used in 2SLS and 3SLS
using the Stock and Yogo test for weak instruments (or other
weak instrument tests);201 and,
(3) Use the Hausman specification test to determine which estima-
tion technique is most appropriate. 20 2
It is important to note that if the instruments are deemed to be weak,
then 2SLS and 3SLS can be very misleading. In this case, the Hausman
specification test will lack information, and using OLS may be most ap-
propriate. Thus, following all three steps appropriately is essential.
The Stock and Yogo test indicates whether or not the instruments
used in the first-stage regression are "strong"-that is, whether they have
adequate predictive power for the endogenous regressor. If the first-
stage F-statistic (or minimum eigenvalue) from regressing the endoge-
nous regressor on the set of excluded instruments and any control vari-
ables not included in the structural equation exceeds the critical value
(provided by Stock and Yogo), then the null hypothesis of weak instru-
ments is rejected. If the first-stage F-statistic is less than the critical value,
the instruments are weak and the IV estimates are potentially biased and
inconsistent.
The Stock and Yogo test is the primary test of instrument validity that
Bhagat and Bolton used. However, two other weak instrument tests were
also applied in the analysis: the Hahn and Hausman test for weak instru-
ments and the Hansen-Sargan test. The Hahn and Hausman test com-
pares the forward and reverse 2SLS estimators. 20 3 If the instruments are
valid, the forward estimator should be equal to the inverse of the reverse
estimator, adjusted for a bias term. The Hansen-Sargan test compares
the residuals from the second-stage regression with the first-stage instru-
ments and control variables. If there is no correlation (i.e., low R2) in
this regression, then the instruments are well-identified and valid. The
results from using all three of these weak instruments tests are generally
consistent throughout Bhagat and Bolton's analyses.
201. See generally James H. Stock & Motohiro Yogo, Testing for Weak Instruments in
Linear IV Regression, in Identification and Inference for Econometric Models: Essays in
Honor of Thomas J. Rothenberg 80 (D.W.K. Andrews & J.H. Stock eds., 2005) (outlining
"quantitative definitions of weak instruments based on the maximum [instrumental
variable] estimator bias, or the maximum Wald test size distortion, when there are multiple
endogenous regressors").
202. See generally Jerry A. Hausman, Specification Tests in Econometrics, 46
Econometrica 1251, 1264-66 (1978) (outlining Hausman specification test for
simultaneous equation systems).
203. SeeJinyong Hahn &Jerry Hausman, A New Specification Test for the Validity of
Instrumental Variables, 70 Econometrica 163, 166-69 (2002). The "reverse" 2SLS
estimator exchanges the left-hand side and right-hand side endogenous variables.
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The Hausman test for endogeneity compares the OLS estimates with
the IV estimates to see if IV estimation is necessary. The test statistic is
constructed as follows:
h =_ (rots - fpiv)'(var (/ots) - var (rv) ) - (fioLs - f3n,).
This statistic has a chi-square distribution with degrees of freedom
equal to the number of potentially endogenous regressors. If the differ-
ence between the OLS and IV estimates is large, then OLS is not ade-
quate. This test is used to compare estimation techniques: OLS to 2SLS,
OLS to 3SLS, and 2SLS to 3SLS. High h-statistics (low p-values) suggest
there is a difference between estimation techniques. If the instruments
are valid, this test suggests which estimation method should be used.
The two following supplementary tables based on the results in
Bhagat and Bolton illustrate the process of using the different estimation
techniques and diagnostic tests. Table Al presents the results for the dif-
ferent governance variables in equation (la) and each performance varia-
ble in the next year. It presents the results from all three estimation tech-
niques-OLS, 2SLS, and 3SLS-and compares them side-by-side. The
Hausman test is used to determine which estimation technique is most
appropriate, and this is highlighted by the bold result in each cell. For
example, in looking at the effect that the G-Index has on next year's
Tobin's Q we note that there is a negative and significant relationship in
OLS. This result is consistent with GIM's findings, which are discussed
supra Part I.C.1. However, when potential endogeneity between govern-
ance and performance is allowed, the Hausman test indicates that using
OLS is inappropriate and that we should be considering the 2SLS results.
The coefficient in the 2SLS estimation is positive and marginally signifi-
cant, which is contrary to GIM's results. This analysis highlights the criti-
cal importance of using an instrumental variables approach to allow for
potentially endogenous regressors.
However, the results of the IV estimation are not reliable unless the
instruments used are valid. Table A2 illustrates the process by which
Bhagat and Bolton use the diagnostic tests to check for endogeneity and
strength of instruments. Results are presented using return on assets
(ROA) as the performance measure and with the G-Index and director
ownership as measures of governance; the process is the same for the
other governance variables. The top section of each panel indicates the
coefficient on the governance variable from equation (la); these results
are the same as those presented in Table 1. The "Hausman Specification
Test" section shows the comparison between the three estimation tech-
niques. In Panel A for ROA,, there is a difference between OLS and 2SLS
and there is a difference between OLS and 3SLS, but there is no differ-
ence between 2SLS and 3SLS; thus, 2SLS is the appropriate technique.
In Panel B for ROA,, there is a difference between OLS and 2SLS, but not
between OLS and 3SLS; thus, again, 2SLS is the appropriate technique.
The "Stock & Yogo Weak Instruments Test" section presents the F-statis-
tics from the first-stage reduced form regression and the appropriate crit-
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ical values from Stock and Yogo. In all cases, the F-statistic exceeds the
critical value, suggesting that the instruments are indeed strong and the
IV estimation is valid. Results for the other governance variables are
similar.
TABLE Al: COMPARISON OF ESTIMATION METHODS
This table presents the summary results from estimating equa-
tion (1) with seven different measures of governance and three dif-
ferent measures of performance. Only the coefficients on the gov-
ernance variable in equation (la) are presented; p-values are below
in parentheses. All governance variables are as defined in Tables 1
and 2. The performance variables are Next Year's ROA, Next Year's
Stock Return, and Next Year's Tobin's Q. Equation (1) is estimated
using OLS, 2SLS, and 3SLS. The Stock and Yogo weak instruments
test is used to confirm that the instrumental variables approaches
(2SLS and 3SLS) are valid. The Hausman specification test is used
to determine which estimation method is most appropriate. The re-
sults from this test are presented in bold (for example, when consid-
ering the G-Index in the ROA equation, the Hausman test indicates
that 2SLS least squares is the appropriate method to use).
Next Year's ROA Next Year's Stock Return Next Year's Tobin's Q
OLS 2SLS 3SLS OLS 2SLS 3SIS OLS 2SLS 3SLS
GIM G-Index -0.001 -0.011 -0.011 -0.003 -0.013 -0.014 -0.045 0.156 0.164
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.44) (0.71) (0.69) (0.00) (0.11) (0.10)
BCF E-Index -0.005 -0.031 -0.032 0.001 -0.021 -0.022 -0.143 0.242 0.227
(0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.89) (0.81) (0.81) (0.00) (0.33) (0.36)
Glass Lewis BA Index -0.004 -0.017 -0.017 -0.003 -0.008 -0.007 -0.167 -0.339 -0.324
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.69) (0.85) (0.85) (0.00) (0.17) (0.16)
TCL Benchmark Score 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.037 0.048
(0.26) (0.27) (0.26) (0.14) (0.97) (0.97) (0.38) (0.20) (0.09)
BC Gov-Score 0.000 -0.005 -0.005 0.007 -0.049 -0.099 -0.003 0.034 0.125
(0.85) (0.61) (0.65) (0.09) (0.41) (0.04) (0.76) (0.08) (0.35)
BC Gov-7 -0.001 -0.006 -0.006 0.001 0.005 0.007 -0.008 -0.03 -0.023
(0.53) (0.28) (0.26) (0.76) (0.64) (0.49) (0.37) (0.41) (0.53)
Director Ownership 0.010 0.005 0.004 0.020 0.008 -0.005 -0.235 0.000 -0.003
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.64) (0.77) (0.00) (1.00) (0.96)
CEO-Chair Duality 0.000 -0.029 -0.028 -0.007 -0.064 -0.058 -0.005 0.209 0.189
(0.88) (0.00) (0.00) (0.75) (0.29) (0.34) (0.94) (0.23) (0.28)
Board Independence -0.052 -0.121 -0.120 -0.038 -0.250 -0.249 -0.666 0.634 0.662
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.42) (0.33) (0.33) (0.00) (0.40) (0.38)
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TABLE A2: ILLUSTRATION OF INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES TESTS
This table presents the governance coefficients from estimating
equation (la) for both GIM's G-Index (Panel A) and the dollar value
of director ownership (Panel B). Results are presented considering
operating performance in all three time periods. At the top of each
panel, the coefficients (p-values in parentheses) are presented. The
Hausman specification test results are also presented; the higher the
h-statistic, the greater the difference between estimation methods.
Finally, the results from the Stock and Yogo weak instruments test
are presented at the bottom of each panel. The F-statistics from the
first-stage reduced form regressions are presented along with the ap-
propriate critical values. Stronger instruments are represented by
higher F-statistics.
Panel A: Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick G-Index
ROA, ROA ,.
OLS 2SLS 3SLS OLS 2SLS 3SLS
-0.001 -0.013 -0.013 -0.001 -0.011 -0.011






Test h-Statistic p-value h-Statistic p-value h-Statistic p-value
OLS - 2SLS 66.8 (0.00) 78.6 (0.00) 37.7 (0.10)
OLS - 3SLS 48.8 (0.01) 69.3 (0.00) 103.4 (0.00)
2SLS - 3SLS 20.0 (0.87) 18.1 (0.92) 31.6 (0.29)
Stock & Yogo Weak Critical Critical Critical
Instruments Test F-Statistic Value F-Statistic Value F-Statistic Value
Governance 35.5 9.5 34.0 9.5 24.8 9.5
CEO Ownership 215.2 9.5 232.0 9.5 172.1 9.5
Leverage 98.7 9.5 107.0 9.5 87.7 9.5
Panel B: Dollar Value of Median Director Stock Ownership
ROA, ROA,.1  ROA., ,..2
OLS 2SLS 3SLS OLS 2SLS 3SLS OLS 2SLS 3SLS
Governance 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.010 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002
(0.00) (0.01) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.16) (0.18)
Hausman Specification
Test h-Statistic p-value h-Statistic p-value h-Statistic p-value
OLS - 2SLS 127.7 (0.00) 148.6 (0.00) 42.9 (0.04)
OLS - 3SLS -2,123.0 - 1.8 (1.00) 17.3 (0.94)
2SLS - 3SLS 1,407.0 (0.00) 6.6 (1.00) -16.7 -
Stock & Yogo Weak Critical Critical Critical
Instruments Test F-Statisic Value F-Statistic Value F-Statistic Value
Governance 180.2 9.5 185.1 9.5 139.5 9.5
CEO Ownership 250.5 9.5 257.7 9.5 197.5 9.5
Leverage 96.5 9.5 107.2 9.5 92.7 9.5
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